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2Financing a just transition transaction in South Africa
Prior to 2020, the South African economy was facing major socio-economic 
challenges, struggling to eliminate poverty and reduce persistent inequality. The 
COVID crisis has deepened the financial crisis, with the last major agency putting 
the country’s rating below investment grade, or ‘junk status’. The recovery plan 
starts with rescue. The climate crisis is longer-term but still needs as urgent action 
as ever. The country is preparing to enhance its nationally determined contribution 
in an unprecedented context. Decarbonisation of the electricity sector is a priority 
– but in the SA context requires careful attention to communities and workers 
dependent on coal. 
The just transition transaction (JTT) is being developed in technical detail since 
2019 by Meridian Economics (2020) and making the financial deal is work in 
progress. In brief, the transaction mobilises blended finance to fund the accelerated 
phase out of coal, thereby accelerating a transition from coal to renewable energy, 
and a portion of the concessional funds flows into Just Transition fund. This case 
study reflects on the JTT, seeking to understand its architecture, the potential 
to catalyse changes in the complex set of challenges in the electricity sector, by 
funding accelerated phase-out of coal and a just transition in South Africa, with 
broader implications for international climate finance. The time-scale of developing 
the transaction is fluid, while implementation of decommissioning would take many 
years. 
The purpose of the study is to understand the potential of a just transition 
transaction to accelerate the phase out of coal-fired power and to fund 
development projects. The purpose requires a specific focus, and it is important to 
understand what is included in the scope of this case study, and what lies beyond 
that scope. 
The spatial scale of the analysis is national, in that Eskom debt threatens South 
Africa’s financial sustainability. Physically, the Mpumalanga province is a key focus 
of this study. This province of South Africa contains its Central coal basin, most of 
the coal-fired power stations, surrounded by poor communities with several small 
rural towns dependent on coal for livelihoods. Local environmental degradation 
is visible with poor local air quality. Another negative impact on health is from 
acid mine drainage. Thus, communities in Mpumalanga are vulnerable in many 
respects. Mpumalanga is a micro-cosm of the challenges of sustainable energy 
development in South Africa – environmentally, socially and economically. If a just 
transition transaction can shift Mpumalanga to development pathway of increased 
sustainability, then this should be possible elsewhere in the country. In the post-
COVID context, JTTs may be an instrument of interest in across the world.
The scope of this case study is national and on the just transition transaction. 
We place the JTT in the context of Just Transition, understood more broadly 
internationally and in SA (sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2), but make no claim to treat the JT 
comprehensively. 
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Our focus is on mitigation, and the contribution that a just transition transaction 
can make in South Africa’s electricity sector. As the national utility, Eskom, runs 
all the coal-fired power plants and its financial situation is a major challenge, 
detailed information on Eskom is within the scope of the study. Some lessons for 
other countries are briefly explored in section 2.1.5, but not investigated in detail. 
Implications of the JTT are focused on the electricity sector, and hence relating to 
coal; our scope does not include impacts of climate change and adaptation, which 
are also important in a just transition.
The rest of this Introduction sets the context of research on just transition 
transaction. It briefly outlines the political economy of South Africa, the relevant 
policies on climate and development, and the electricity sector specifically. The 
baseline for GHG emissions is taken from the official plan for electricity, and the 
transition for workers and communities dependent on coal outlined briefly. 
Since this research started in July 2019, two significant changes have taken place. 
Firstly, a related proposal to use pension funds was advanced, and secondly, the 
COVID crisis changed the financial landscape globally and in SA. These changes 
are reviewed to inform the research question and sub-questions, which are laid out 
before the methodology (including some working definitions). The final part of the 
Introduction considers international and South African understandings of a Just 
Transition, before section 2 turns to the transaction.




A just transition addresses both development and climate. It addresses 
issues of energy and social justice. A transition in the energy sector is 
from fossil fuels to lower-emissions energy sources and systems is critical 
for mitigation globally and in SA. To be just, the socio-economic needs of 
countries, and particularly affected communities and workers, need to be 
addressed (ILO 2015). 
A JTT thus needs to meet multiple objectives, and international climate 
finance should consider carbon and reduction of poverty, inequality, 
unemployment – or more generally, national development goals. In this way, 
a just transition can contribute to the global Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) and the goals of the Paris Agreement. In South Africa, we first need 
to understand the political economy in which national development and 
climate policies operate.
1.1.1 SA political economy
South Africa’s political economy has been dominated by a Minerals-Energy 
Complex (MEC). Fine and Rustomjee (1996) in a seminal article coined the 
term MEC, showing that minerals and energy had an influence on politics 
disproportionate to the sectors’ contribution to economic output. They 
traced the history into the 1990s, including key industrial policy decisions 
that favoured mining, electricity and liquid fuel supply and minerals 
beneficiation. The MEC has shaped the history of energy policy in South 
Africa (Marquard 2006). The country’s dependency on coal was entrenched 
in the 1970s with massive infrastructure investment in new coal mines, 
large coal power plants, coal to liquid fuels plants and a massive rise in coal 
exports – all developments that were very strongly supported by the state 
(Burton 2011). 
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In the post-apartheid era, rather than diversifying the economy away from these 
industries, government industrial policy, funding and incentives, coupled with the 
liberalisation of the economy, have resulted in an increasing dominance of MEC 
sectors and a concomitant decline in non-MEC manufacturing, with associated 
negative effects on employment and socio-economic development (Burton 2011). 
There are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for electricity (Eskom), transport, 
aviation, arms manufacture, putting significant pressure on public finances. 
Electricity-intensive industry has dominated exports (ibid), even as historically low 
electricity tariffs have started to rise. While diversifying away from coal has been 
energy policy for more than two decades (DME 1998), shifts have only started 
occurring with climate policy and more competitive renewables from the 2010’s. 
There continues to be significant state support for new coal-fired power plants, 
subsidies for new privately owned coal plants, public finance directed at coal mining 
and direct state involvement in coal extraction, as well as regulated prices for liquid 
fuels that protect the conversion of coal to liquid fuels, sustaining carbon lock-in 
(Burton, Lott, and Rennkamp 2018).
South Africa’s past development pathway has led to high emissions, poverty, 
inequality and unemployment (Winkler 2018). This is a challenging context in which 
to undertake ambitious climate policy. While impacts on poor communities are 
understood (as an added stress), reducing emissions has a high opportunity cost – 
spending on basic needs, social grants and generally socio-economic development. 
Many of the incumbents in the coal value chain – from mines through electricity 
and liquid fuel supply to beneficiation – have a vested interest in continuing on 
an energy development path based on coal. The need for sector jobs resilience 
plans (SJRP) has long been debated and a proposal for a SJRP focusing on the 
coal value chain has been developed (Makgetla et al. 2020). In an economy that 
was in a precarious state before the COVID crisis, realising a just transition is a 
huge challenge. In this political economy, there is very high political sensitivity to 
employment gains or losses. 
Apartheid produces very high levels of inequality in South Africa, the country 
having the highest GINI coefficient in the world. Unlike Brazil, which during the Lula 
administration managed to reduce similarly high disparities in income across its 
population, inequality has persisted in post-Apartheid South Africa. While it has 
been argued compellingly that asset inequality is more persistent than income 
inequality (Pikkety 2013), the latter is the more common measure, including in 
South Africa (Winkler 2018). Figure 1 illustrates a notional household of 5 people – 
one might think that with a monthly income of R 50,000, this household would be 
solidly in the middle of the SA distribution. However, the actual position is the green 
line, whilst the median value is shown by the small red line.
This is underpinned by the robust overall finding of a review of the economics 
of income inequality, “that inequality in incomes is extremely high from a global 
comparative perspective and has increased since the democratic transition in 
1994” (Leibbrandt and Ranchhod 2017). The exploitation of workers by firms 
continues, even as the form of work is changing radically. 
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Economic growth has been “anaemic” since the global financial crisis and this has 
led to high formal unemployment even by South African standards (StatsSA 2020). 
Based on a narrow definition, national unemployment stood at 29.1% in the fourth 
quarter of 2019, and 38.7% by a broader definition that includes discouraged work 
seekers (StatsSA 2020). Unemployment will almost certainly get worse post-
COVID. The National Development Plan (NDP) indicated that economic growth 
needs to exceed 5% per year for a sustained period to implement its programme 
(NPC 2011); initial projections post-COVID indicate -2.1% (McKinsey best case) to 
-16% (long recovery scenario by SA-TIED) for 2020, with a narrower range for 2021 
(Hartley 2020 pers comm), but these are still highly uncertain. However, no-one 
is projecting positive GDP growth, so that is seems reasonable to assume that 
“inequality stemming from an unjust past will continue to anchor the country to an 
unequal future” (StatsSA 2019) – unless there are a major financial interventions. 
FIGURE 1
Income inequality in South Africa and across selected 
countries by ventile 
Source: SALDRU income comparison tool (accessed July 2020) 
http://www.saldru.uct.ac.za/income-comparison-tool/
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Development pathways are the result of decisions by a wide range of social 
forces or actors, across time and spatial scales. In order to understand how a just 
transition might shift from historically high-emissions and exclusive development 
to low-emissions, inclusive development, it is helpful to understand the coalitions 
supporting change and those opposing (and how these shift over time and specific 
actors many change allegiances). The relationships between business, industry and 
government directly impact the formulating national policy, including energy and 
climate policy. A considerable and concerted government lobbying effort is made 
by actors and associations that represent industrial sectors – as a general matter, 
which in South Africa include particularly petrochemicals, minerals, heavy industry, 
and coal power generation. Such groups would be opposed to more ambitious 
climate targets, and may argue their position on the grounds of equity against 
further action (Cunliffe et al. 2019). Rennkamp has analysed policy networks and 
the discourses of opposing coalitions, finding that “powerful coalitions of coal-
related industries and their lobbies have constrained institutional change and 
managed to delay the implementation of carbon pricing measures” (Rennkamp 
2019). 
Coal-dominated electricity supply is the largest sector of GHG emissions and also 
the area where most mitigation can be achieved in the period 2020 to 2050 in SA. 
Greenhouse gas emissions in Mpumalanga province are mainly from electricity 
generation. Renewable energy (RE) technologies have become competitive, 
particularly wind and solar photovoltaics (PV). Ambitious mitigation requires the 
decommissioning of coal. The existing coal fleet is ageing, yet many communities 
depend for their livelihoods on coal mines, power stations and downstream 
beneficiation. The official electricity plan – the 2019 Integrated Resource Plan 
(IRP) - is a useful starting point, but reflects a ‘political settlement’ across many 
stakeholders, having been debated for almost a decade. Can international climate 
finance be used to accelerate the decommissioning of coal plants? This idea is at 
the heart of an innovative just transition transaction, and the focus of this case 
study. 
1.1.2 Policies, plans and institutions for   
 climate change mitigation
In this context of SA’s broader political economy, an overall framework for climate 
change policy has been developed. To set the scene for the contribution that a just 
transition transaction can make to mitigation, it is important to understand national 
policy on climate change, the national development plan (NDP) and the nationally 
determined contribution (NDC) communicated internationally. 
The NDP includes a chapter 5 on “environmental sustainability: an equitable 
transition to a low-carbon economy” (NPC 2011). The development plan is thus 
salient for a just transition. 
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Beyond the chapter in the first (and still current) NDP, the National Planning 
Commission which developed the NDP has undertaken a two-year process to 
develop a vision of a just transition. The process has produce a draft 2050 vision 
pathways for a just transition to a low carbon, climate resilient economy and society 
(NPC 2019). The final vision for a just transition was to be adopted at a summit- with 
leaders of government, business, labour and civil society – in early 2020, but this 
event has been delayed due to the COVID crisis. The NDP remains important to that 
climate change policy needs to address core developmental challenges – the triple 
challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment (NPC 2011). 
South Africa adopted climate policy for the first time in 2011, the same year as 
the NDP. Following a two-year process of consultation, climate policy was adopted 
in the form a National Climate Change Response White Paper (NCCRWP) (RSA 
2011). The NCCRWP sets out a long-term climate mitigation pathway – a “peak, 
plateau and decline trajectory” used as the initial benchmark against which the 
efficacy of mitigation actions will be measured’. Peak, plateau and decline (PPD) is 
a GHG emissions trajectory range after mitigation. The NCCRWP policy refers to 
the PPD trajectory as the initial benchmark against which the efficacy of mitigation 
actions will be measured. The PPD is thus the form or shape, which South Africa’s 
mitigation ambition is to follow. The NCCRWP spells out key points, stating:
“In summary:
 › South Africa’s GHG emissions peak in the period 2020 to 2025 in a range 
with a lower limit of 398 Megatonnes (109 kg) (Mt) CO2-eq and upper limits 
of 583 Mt CO2-eq and 614 Mt CO2-eq for 2020 and 2025 respectively.
 › South Africa’s GHG emissions will plateau for up to ten 
years after the peak within the range with a lower limit of 
398 Mt CO2-eq and upper limit of 614 Mt CO2-eq.
 › From 2036 onwards, emissions will decline in absolute 
terms to a range with lower limit of 212 Mt CO2-eq and 
upper limit of 428 Mt CO2-eq by 2050” (RSA 2011).
The national benchmark trajectory range takes several things into consideration: 
i) South Africa’s mitigation potential; ii) the requirement for South Africa to make 
a fair contribution to the international mitigation effort; and iii) South Africa’s 
national circumstances – what the best pathway is to a low-carbon future, given its 
development challenges.
South Africa communicated its “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution” 
(INDC) in September 2015 (RSA 2015). The INDC was therefore communicated 
before the Paris Agreement was adopted. An INDC becomes a country’s first NDC 
after ratification of the Paris Agreement, which for South Africa was in November 
2016, unless the country specifies otherwise. 
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In the case of SA, the INDC and the first NDC (RSA 2016) are the same. The first 
NDC includes mitigation, adaptation and support components. 
Mitigation targets in NDCs are sometimes used synonymously with NDCs, though 
they are a distinct element. South Africa’s first (and still current) NDC frames its 
mitigation target as a fixed level target range, a ‘peak, plateau and decline’ or PPD 
trajectory, referring explicitly to national policy and thus building on the NCCRWP. 
From this PPD trajectory range, two mitigation targets were chosen and included 
as economy-wide emissions limits in the NDC, in a wide range between 398 
and 614 Mt CO2-eq for 2025 and 2030 (RSA 2016). The provincial government of 
Mpumulanga has made clear for some time that it intends to contribute to climate 
action (Mpumalanga Provincial Government 2011), has commissioned a greenhouse 
gas inventory and its working towards a mitigation and air quality strategy. 
South Africa’s next NDC, applicable to the period 2031 to 2035, is due to be 
communicated to the UNFCCC in 2024/5. South Africa is in the process of updating 
its current NDC, which it expects to communicate to the UNFCCC in late 2020 
(though with the COVID crisis, this time-line may change). Formally, South Africa 
already has mitigation targets for both 2025 and 2030, and so would need to 
only update. However, it seems possible for South Africa to be more ambitious 
in NDCs to be enhanced in 2020, given that renewable energy is competitive, 
economic growth has been slow, the flexibility of renewable energy post-COVID, and 
responding to the urgency of action as made clear in the IPCC special report on 1.5 
°C. 
1.1.3 Electricity sector
Electricity planning is relevant to just transition. South Africa’s official electricity 
plan is the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP). Following a long process, the previous 
version of the IRP (DoE (Department of Energy) 2011) was eventually updated with 
Cabinet promulgating a new IRP in October 2019. The 2019 IRP defines the mix 
of coal, nuclear, renewable energy and other sources up to 2030 (DoE 2019). The 
IRP in both 2011 and 2019 took into account a share of the PPD trajectory for the 
electricity sector. 
10Financing a just transition transaction in South Africa
South Africa’s electricity sector has long been dominated by coal, with one nuclear 
reactor and only since 2010 a rapid growth of renewable energy. Key actors in the 
sector are the national utility (Eskom), the regulator (NERSA), national government 
departments with Energy responsible for policy and planning and Public 
Enterprises the shareholder, municipal electricity supply departments, the SA Local 
Government Association (SALGA), business – particularly those organised into an 
Energy-Intensive Users Group -, as well as business organisation (Business Unity 
SA; and the National Business Initiative being most active), recently firms in the RE 
industry (with technology-specific association for wind and solar PV), labour unions 
(including metalworkers and mine-workers), households (not clearly represented) 
and civil society organisations (active and organised). For an analysis of coalitions 
favouring fossil fuels (coal) and renewable energy, see Rennkamp and co-authors 
(Rennkamp 2019; Rennkamp et al. 2017). 
Eskom generates more than 90% of electricity supply, with more than 80% coming 
from coal-fired power stations (Eskom 2019b), mostly located in Mpumalanga. 
Eskom is a vertically integrated utility, and also controls the transmissions as the 
system operator. In terms of distribution, Eskom sells power to local authorities 
for distribution and distributes power directly to consumers. Of the 208 TWh 
that Eskom of total sales in 2019, 42% went to municipalities, 6% to exports and 
the remaining 52% sold directly to industrial, mining, transport, commercial and 
residential customers (Eskom 2019b). Eskom is the provider of the last resort, i.e. 
has to supply electricity if no other generator can. It currently has exclusive rights to 
buy from independent power producers (IPPs), effectively controlling access to the 
grid by competing generators. Though an independent system operator has long 
been mooted (Pickering 2010), and even gone through Parliament, this reform has 
not yet taken place. 
Mpumalanga province is a micro-cosm of the challenges of a just transition in SA, 
and within the province, specific municipalities are particularly affected, notably 
Emalahleni, Steve Tshwete, Msukaligwa and Govan Mbeki districts. The province 
adopted a climate change declaration in the lead up to COP17 (Mpumalanga 
Provincial Government 2011) and more recently has developed a green economy 
strategy (Mpumalanga Provincial Treasury 2018). 
Mpumalanga is shown in Figure 2, illustrating the Eskom power stations in the 
province on the left-hand side and areas of coal mining on the right hand side. 
The central coal basin which holds most of SA’s coal reserves, is located in 
Mpumalanga. 
Historically, Eskom did not have to pay tax and dividends, and was the recipient of 
other indirect subsidies, such as insurance by the country’s Reserve Bank against 
currency depreciation in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
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Sources: Eskom for Eskom’s power stations1; lower panel - Minerals Council of SA(Eberhard 2011)2 
This gave Eskom a significant financial advantage - the estimated benefit to Eskom 
was R22 579 million between 1986 and 1998 (G Steyn 2000). Being able to rely on 
government funding has, according to some, contributed to significant allocative 
inefficiency (Roberts 2005). Even with this windfall, Eskom’s debt burden was 
high in the 1980s, but since the early 1990s, Eskom was able to reduce its debt-
equity ratio in the 1990s. This low ratio was attributed to low demand at the time 
for further capital expenditure – having followed a period of overbuilding in the 
1970s and 1980s (Marquard 2006) - and electricity priced at a very low marginal 
cost (Davis and Steyn 1998; Eberhard 2000; Van Horen and Simmonds 1998). 
Eskom’s high debt-equity ratio in 1986 at 2.93 declined to 0.85 in 1998 (Grové Steyn 
2000), and was reduced further by 11.5% per year to 0.63 in 2000 (Eskom 2000); 
whereas in 2019 the ratio stood at 3.1 (Eskom 2019a). In a commercial firm, lower 
debt repayments would have been replaced by higher payments of dividends to 
shareholders, but this did not happen in the case of Eskom until after 2001. 





Eskom power stations, including coal-fired (left panel) and coal 
mining (right panel), illustrating Mpumalanga province as key 
focal point
Location of coal resources in South Africa
LIMPOPO
MPUMALANGA
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With the capital costs of power plants having been paid off by consumers and 
others in the 1970s and 1980s, consumers are currently paying only for coal and 
distribution costs. The overall effect is that the price of electricity does not reflect 
true costs (the value of the inputs used to produce electricity): the full capital costs 
are not reflected, nor are externalities priced. While tariffs have not been cost-
reflective, it is difficult to raise them further – and Eskom debt is a major challenge 
pertinent to the just transition transaction. 
In recent years, Eskom’s technical performance has been declining. South Africa 
experience load-shedding from 2008 onwards, something that was unusual until 
then. Eskom plant energy availability factor (EAF) has declined from assumptions 
of averaging 86% in the IRP 2011 to “levels below 70%” reported in IRP 2019 (DMRE 
(Department of Mineral Resources and Energy) 2019). Further discussion on 
operational challenges is taken up in section 2.1.1.1).
The Minister of Public Enterprises, Pravin Gordhan, put forward a ‘roadmap for 
Eskom in a reformed electricity industry (DPE 2019). Gordhan previously served 
as Finance Minister (twice, the second time after his successor Nhlanha Nene 
was infamously dismissed by then President Zuma after serving for a weekend). 
The roadmap indicated “strong Government support in the form of subordinated 
loans, direct equity injection and guarantees“ (DPE, 2019). The roadmap explicitly 
mentions a Just Transition, including sustainability for workers. It also includes 
reference to SA’s position on climate change, IRP commitments, Eskom’s plan to 
reduce emission, sustainability for communities, reflections on the national interest 
and smart grids (DPE 2019). The roadmap is not detailed on how the JT is to be 
financed. 
Power sector reform saw a wave across many countries in sub-Saharan Africa from 
the 1990s, but was not was not realized in South Africa (Clark 2001; Eberhard 2005; 
Kapika and Eberhard 2013). Eskom’s debt crisis appears to be changing that. The 
2019 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement presented two phases of unbundling, 
first a functional separation of generation, transmission and distribution by March 
2020, and a second phase with legal separation of distribution and generation by 
the end of 2021 (National Treasury 2019). The Finance Minister also announced that 
it will soon be possible for municipalities “in financially good standing” to purchase 
electricity from independent power producers (Mboweni, 2019b). A new CEO for 
Eskom was appointed from January 2020, and he has referred to “divisionalisation” 
(de Ruyter 2020a). Minister Gordhan has described divisionalisation as an early 
step towards the ultimate separation of generation, transmission and distribution, 
and an independent transmission entity (Gordhan 2020). Much of the Eskom debt 
is owed by generation. Anton Eberhard has written extensively about power sector 
reform since the early 2000’s, and recently has argued for separation of performing 
from non-performing entities (Eberhard 2019), the latter being in generation and 
some distribution. 
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An independent transmission system and market operator (ITSMO) could 
become financially viable fairly quickly, so that at least the transmission grid is 
protected from any fall-out on Eskom debt. In a more decentralised power system, 
independent third-party access to the ‘wires’ is essential. 
The ‘new kids on the block’ in SA’s electricity sector are renewable energy IPPs. The 
emergence of new entrants has started to change the shape of the MEC, though 
electricity generation from RE is still small enough not to be an existential threat to 
the incumbent, Eskom. Apart from some self-generation, electricity supply came 
from Eskom. While there were long debates about power sector reform (Clark 
2001; Eberhard 2005; Eberhard & Godinho 2017b; Wamukonya 2003), reforms 
were not implemented prior to the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer 
Procurement Programme (REI4P) in South Africa. The REI4P is widely considered a 
success (Baker & Wlokas 2015; Eberhard, Kolker & Leigland 2014; Morris & Martin 
2015; Ndlovu & Inglesi-Lotz 2019). The REI4P is a competitive tender process that 
was launched to facilitate private sector investment into grid-connected renewable 
energy (RE) generation, and several lessons have been learned (Eberhard & Naude 
2016). 
South Africa highlighted in its first NDC the investments in the REI4P: 
“South Africa has already made significant investments 
in mitigation. As part of a Renewable Energy Independent 
Power Producer Procurement Programme (REI4P) has 
approved 79 renewable energy IPP projects, total 5 243MW, 
with private investment totalling ZAR 192 billion (approx. 
US$ 16 billion). Another 6300 MW are under consideration. 
Investment in public transport infrastructure was US$ 0.5 
billion in 2012, and is expected to continue growing at 5% 
per year. South Africa established a South African Green 
Fund with an allocated US$ 0.11 billion in the 2011 to 2013 
budgets to support catalytic and demonstration green 
economy initiatives. Resources for the Fund will have to be 
increased in future to enable and support the scaling up 
of viable and successful initiatives, including contributions 
from domestic, private sector and international sources” 
RSA 2016
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For further discussion of further developments, institutional innovation, rapidly 
falling costs of wind and solar PV in particular, and the structural challenges that 
Eskom faces with new entrants, see section 2.1.1.2 below. Ownership models of RE 
which are an important part of JT are discussed in 2.2.
1.1.4 Concept of just transition      
transaction 
A presidentially appointed ‘electricity sustainability task team’ have been looking 
at climate finance, and a just transition transaction being developed by Meridian 
Economics, promoted by the Presidential Eskom Sustainability Task Team and 
under consideration by government, including the National Treasury Department 
(Cohen 2019a; Tyler 2019) – on which some details have been presented (Tyler 
2019) and see concept by Meridian Economics (2020) and reported in the media 
(Cohen 2019a; Davie 2019; Joubert 2019). The opportunity for this transaction 
arises from the context the Paris Agreement recognition of the close links 
between climate action, sustainable development and a just transition, the gap in 
international climate finance targets, and the critical role that DFIs play in realizing 
global sustainability goals (Meridian Economics 2020).
The just transition has been described by Meridian Economics (2020) as consisting 
of three legs: 
1. The South African Government and Eskom will commit 
to delivering additional, measurable CO2 reductions over 
and above the current policy trajectory; in return:
2. Eskom’s access to its traditional debt funding sources (DFIs, 
MDBs, capital markets, banks, etc.) will be restored; while 
3. Affected labour and communities will benefit from a Just 
Transition programme backed by the net proceeds from the 
transaction, and the crowding in of new energy projects and 
other infrastructure in Mpumalanga and beyond.” 
The concept is illustrated in Figure 3 overleaf, and elaborated further in the 
following. The transaction would fund the accelerated phase-out of coal, leading to 
emission reductions. 
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Analysis of the JTT is undertaken in detail in section 2.1 of this report; however, the 
reader is introduced to the concept and elements of the JTT here. 
The JTT takes place in a broader context, which is elaborated in the rest of this 
section. Figure 4 shows the analytical framework within which the analysis of the 
JTT is undertaken. The JTT is the ellipse at the centre of Figure 4 including key 
financial flows (see section 2.1.2 below), the complex challenges facing Eskom are 
shown at top left (and see sections 1.1.3 and 2.1.1), the funding of the just transition 
on development projects at bottom right (see 2.1.3.3) and reductions of GHG 
emissions at top right (see 1.1.5). The concept of transition finance is an important 
innovation, represented by the arrows in v-formation across Figure 4.
FIGURE 3
Concept of just transition transaction
Source: Presentation on behalf of Meridian Economics (Tyler 2019)
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FIGURE 4
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The JTT as one tool help transform South Africa’s energy infrastructure is further 
analysed in section 2. It is important to note that Figure 4 shows the JTT which is 
the focus of this case study, as well as illustrating elements that are not directly part 
of the JTT but relevant to it.
The financial flows are explained in more fully below, but the major financial 
flows are central to the concept and hence previewed here. Figure 3 illustrates 
that the JTT funds the additional costs of accelerated phase out of coal directly. 
Concessional finance flows into the JT Fund, further elaborated below. The JTT 
does not directly fund payment of Eskom debt (in March 2019 at R440 bn, see 
section 2.1.1.3), but does enable indirect access to capital markets. Reforms within 
Eskom address some of its internal issues (operational, structural and financial, 
see 2.1.1), though this is not explicitly a condition (Meridian Economics 2020). 
These reforms are increasingly required by National Treasury, in providing equity 
injections, and the Department of Public Enterprises as the shareholder (DPE 2019; 
National Treasury 2019b). 
The energy transition is only just if it leaves no one behind, in particular 
communities and workers dependent on coal (section 1.3.3). The JT transaction 
creates financial flows to the Just Transition Fund that in turn focuses on this issue. 
Further research is needed on a funding strategy, which would be co-developed 
with local communities, workers and municipalities. Such a strategy could guide the 
implementation of development projects that the JT Fund would support. 
1.1.5 Reductions from what?      
Baselines for GHG emissions     
and decommissioning of coal plants 
To understand reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the baseline needs 
to be understood, and the ‘project’ – in this case the just transition transaction. 
In brief, the JTT funds the delivery of additional, measurable reductions of CO2 
emissions through the accelerated phase-out of coal. The JTT ensures that affected 
workers and communities benefit from a JT fund, which can fund development 
projects in a manner that promotes social justice. The JTT does not directly fund 
payment of Eskom debt, but does enable indirect access to capital markets. The 
JTT assumes that Eskom reforms address operational, structural and financial 
challenges. The JTT is elaborated in further detail in section 2.1.2. 
Here we move on to the baseline question: To attract large-scale climate finance, 
the transaction must reduce GHG emissions. But emissions reduced from what 
level? 
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Reports have suggested that the JTT will generate large emission reductions. It 
would do so in two ways, by reduced emissions from coal-fired power stations 
which are phased out earlier, which creates space for more low-carbon electricity 
generating options, notably renewable energy. “Under the new plan, the country 
would add an additional 10GWs of renewable-energy production capacity over a 
decade, thereby reducing its potential carbon dioxide emissions by 715-million 
metric tons by 2050” (Cohen 2019). The reductions depend on the baseline, and 
what is assumed would have happened without the JTT. 
The obvious basis for an emission baseline for the JTT is the IRP 2019 (DoE 2019). 
The IRP is the official plan and represents what can be can be achieved in South 
Africa, making the relevant trade-offs among stakeholders over a long process. 
However, the IRP 2019 does not report a GHG emissions projection explicitly. 
Such a baseline can be derived from the preferred build plan. But this would 
not be a government-published emissions baseline. The IRP2019 does include a 
decommissioning schedule for coal, and accelerated phase out could be defined by 
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FIGURE 5
New and committed coal added and coal decommissioned in 
IRP
Source: Authors' own graph, based on data in IRP 2019 (DoE 2019b) 
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Yet the IRP also includes building of new coal plants. The plan “ensures that coal 
still plays an important part in the energy mix”, including two new coal IPPs (1.5 
GW in total), as well as the completion of units of Medupi and Kusile. The two IPPs 
have been found to add significant costs apart from the obvious increase in GHG 
emissions (Ireland and Burton 2018).
Figure 2 takes data from the IRP to show committed coal (Medupi and Kusile), new 
coal included in the plan and coal plants to be decommissioned. 
The official decommissioning schedule is shown in Figure 3. The assumption is that 
coal plants have a 50-year lifetime and that this is the time at which to retire the 
stations (ignoring earlier retirement or life-extensions. Life extension is included 
in the IRP for the Koeberg nuclear power station (DoE 2019). Decommissioning of 
Eskom coal power plants is planned for as early as 2020 (two plants, Grootvlei and 
Komati) and 2023 (Camden), then 2026, 2029, 2033, 2034 and so on. The focus 
in decommissioning in the IRP is to inform the build plan, but the process would 
require retraining and re-skilling. Eskom has recently established a Just Transition 
Office, which is developing a social plan (Rambharos 2020).
Another decommissioning schedule was provided by Eskom in response to a 
request by the Centre for Environmental Rights (Eskom 2020). The legal centre had 
made a request under section 23 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 
(RSA 2000).
FIGURE 6
Emission abatement retrofit programme and 50-year life 
decommissioning
Source: Integrated Resource Plan 2019 (DoE 2019)
20Financing a just transition transaction in South Africa
The schedule in Table 1 provides more precise information for individual units. It 
is not the identical to the schedule from the IRP, in Figure 3, but does appear to 
apply the same approach of assuming 50-year life-times. For example, units 4 
and 5 of Medupi came online in 2017 and are scheduled to be decommissioned in 
2067, earlier than other units. What is clear is that Eskom currently plans to have 
some coal-fired power stations on the grid well into the second half of the twentieth 
century. If new coal plants were built by IPPs and applied the same approach, there 
would be coal=fired power in SA in the 2070s – given the lead-times for building 
large stations including overruns. 
A better assumption for a decommissioning schedule than a fixed life-time is to 
consider the different performance of plants. Plants would be decommissioned 
when it no longer makes economic sense to run them, or coal supply agreements 
expire. 
Studies have identified the risks by power station (Burton, Caetano, and McCall 
2018) and shown that early retirement of specific stations can save significant costs 
(Steyn, Burton, and Steenkamp 2017). An important topic that would benefit from 
further research are decommissioning of individual plants, which constitutes a 
major project in itself. 
The JTT will require more rapid phase-out of coal plants. The decommissioning 
schedule in a coal-dominated electricity sector relates directly to the GHG 
emissions baseline. We will return to this question at the end of the paper. 
TABLE 1
Station and unit decommissioning dates
Source: Eskom (2020)
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1.2.1 Cosatu proposal to use pension    
funds (‘PIC proposal’)
Since the UCT team started research for this case study (July 2019), the proposal 
for a just transition transaction (JTT) has evolved (Meridian Economics 2020) and 
a proposal has emerged to utilise funds from South Africa’s Public Investment 
Corporation (PIC) to address Eskom debt. The proposal was put forward by the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a trade union federation that 
has been part of a ‘tri-partite alliance’ with the African National Congress and the 
South African Communist Party. COSATU made its ‘key economic and Eskom 
intervention proposals’ to a meeting of the alliance in February 2020 (COSATU 
2020). Further technical details are contained in a paper by the Alternative 
Information and Development Centre (AIDC 2020), which is broadly supportive of 
the COSATU proposal though not in every detail. 
1.2.1.1 Differences and similarities 
At first reading, the JTT and PIC proposals appear aimed at Eskom debt, but 
different in that the former draws on international climate finance whereas the 
latter proposes to reallocate public pension funds. This section examines the two 
proposals, their similarities and differences. The proposals may not be mutually 
exclusive, and we also reflect on ways in which the proposals and their supporters 
might work well together. The question is whether any single solution can address 
all parts of the Eskom debt; we argue that it is more likely that different parts will 
be addressed in different ways. What might the relationship be between a domestic 
deal and international climate finance ?
Changing context 
of case study 
1.2
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1.2.1.2 What parts would PIC and JTT fund 
The PIC fund provides other means of repaying loans. Two members of the National 
Union of Mineworkers of SA argued in response that what “we should debate is 
whether as a country we need a plan to stabilise Eskom or a plan to finance the 
energy transition from fossil fuels to a low carbon economy” (Cloete and Sikwebu 
2020). They point out that the PIC proposal by COSATU is focused on how to save 
Eskom and its debt (or as we would specify, funding other means to repay loans). 
The PIC fund provides other means of repaying loans. Other means are important, 
however, in a context where the alternative of government finance – equity 
injections or ‘bailouts’ – are no longer possible. 
The JTT is to fund the additional costs of decommissioning coal and a just 
transition. Its contribution of JTT is making Eskom financeable again, relating to the 
same context of where further equity injections cannot be provided by Treasury. 
The JTT would not provide funding to repay loans, but indirectly enables access to 
capital markets. Indirectly means firstly that the investments flow into a blended 
finance vehicle which lends on to Eskom, and secondly that the improved overall 
financial position may make Eskom more attractive to investors again. For further 
detail, see section 2.1below.
1.2.1.3 Unbundling, privatisation and different    
meanings of restructuring 
The South African labour movement has long been opposed to privatisation 
(Webster and Buhlungu 2004) and actively opposed privatisation of state owned 
enterprises including Eskom (COSATU 2001a, 2001b; COSATU et al. 2005). 
COSATU’s proposal to use PIC funds does not mention unbundling of Eskom. 
AIDC argues that using public funds to address debt “is critical to saving Eskom 
(and other SOEs) and South Africa from more austerity and privatisation” (AIDC 
2020). COSATU does however propose significant changes to Eskom. The COSATU 
proposal identifies many operational problems and issues arising from state 
capture (see implications for Eskom in section 2.1.1.2). 
The JTT is to fund the accelerated phase-out of Eskom coal-fired power stations. 
The JTT proposal refers to an “outdated electricity sector structure”, though 
there is no explicit reference to unbundling or restructuring (Meridian Economics 
2020) and electricity sector reform was signalled as a condition (Cohen 2019; 
Tyler and Steyn 2019). Discussions of ‘privatisation’ tend to be divisive in debates 
around power sector reform, with some arguing for state ownership and others for 
markets, with very strong views in both camps. In practice, unbundling is likely to 
be required for independent access to the grid and to scale up renewable energy. 
In the past, Eskom has not had political support to build renewable energy and it 
currently is not in a financial position to access capital markets. 
23Financing a just transition transaction in South Africa
In this sense, electricity sector reform is a necessary condition for the just 
transition transaction and an accelerated phrase out of coal. To attract international 
climate finance at scale, significant emission reductions are required, which can be 
achieved by less burning of coal and crowding in of renewable energy. To enable 
more RE, electricity sector reform will be required – exactly how goes beyond the 
scope of this case study. 
If ideological differences about the role of markets and state ownership can be put 
aside, it seems possible to find common ground between the proposals. Creating 
an ITSMO may be one element of “restructuring” that is compatible with the JTT 
and PIC proposals. The REI4P benefited from the IPP office. A transaction manager 
within Eskom seems an important function, and might enable a utility with fewer 
coal plants (after decommissioning, supported by JTT). Both the JTT and PIC 
proposal support renewable energy. There is no reason why a range of ownership 
models (see section 2.2) cannot co-exist – including roles for community-, socially-, 
municipally-, privately- and Eskom-owned renewable energy generators. When 
Eskom will be able to invest in any power, including renewable energy, depends on 
returning to financial health – in which the JTT can assist. In a highly decentralised 
future electricity system, who is the ‘supplier of the last resort’ will need to be 
agreed. Decentralised power is not only technically possible, it also has significant 
advantage for democratising energy (Hess 2018). 
1.2.1.4 Funding the just transition through     
development projects 
International climate finance provides the concessional part of blended finance for 
the just transition transaction, and also de-risks the commercial tranche, together 
funding the accelerated phase out of coal. The concessional part flows into just 
transition fund, for development projects. 
What also needs to be financed is “the worker and community-owned renewable 
generation capacity” (Cloete and Sikwebu 2020) which is an important part of a 
just transition. The JT Fund could support the reskilling of workers and affected 
communities, as part of the development project that it would fund and the 
development of a JT action plan. While the JTT does not finance renewables, as 
was needed in the past (Meridian Economics 2020), by decommissioning of coal is 
expected to crowd significant renewable energy capacity funded by third parties . 
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1.2.1.5 How the proposals and supporters could work   
well together 
This section has examined some differences between the JTT and PIC 
proposals. It has also pointed to similarities and possible synergies. The two 
proposals fund different parts of the overall problem of ‘Eskom debt’. More acute 
divides over unbundling can still allow restructuring to be defined around an 
ITSMO and support for renewable energy. The JTT would provide a source of 
funding for development projects that is a share of a large deal. Very concretely, 
there is common cause about funding development projects in Mpumalanga, and 
providing assistance to workers and communities, as well as the municipalities that 
deliver services and develop infrastructure, so that so that no-one is left behind 
(Mpumalanga Provincial Treasury 2018; UN 2015) Looking beyond the proposals to 
actors supporting them, a coalition can be built in support of a just transition. 
1.2.2 Debt and debt relief post-COVID-19 
1.2.2.1 ZAR 500 billion recovery package
On 21 April 2020, President Ramaphosa announced “a massive social relief and 
economic support package of R500 billion, which amounts to around 10% of 
GDP” (Ramaphosa 2020). He characterised this as part of a second phase in the 
response to COVID-19 – the first being national lockdown, the second stabilising 
the economy and protect jobs, and third as recovery. In his concluding remarks, the 
President said that “our economic strategy going forward will require a new social 
compact among all role players – business, labour, community and government – 
to restructure the economy and achieve inclusive growth.” 
The Finance Minister, Tito Mboweni, gave further details on 24 April (Mboweni 
2020b) and is also to table an adjustment to the budget for 2020/21. The Minister 
is the political head of National Treasury, and the department published a detailed 
document on economic measures for COVID-19 (Treasury 2020). 
In terms of spending The President said that the socio-economic support package 
involves: “Firstly, an extraordinary health budget to respond to coronavirus; 
secondly, the relief of hunger and social distress; thirdly, support for companies 
and workers; fourthly, the phased re-opening of the economy” (Ramaphosa 2020). 
A breakdown of the R500 billion package is shown in Table 1 (Table 2 in Treasury 
(2020), adding a column to show values in Euros.
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As one would expect from a social relief and economic support package, the focus 
is very much on ‘red’ spending; ‘red’ here meaning socio-economic spending on 
basic needs and social justice. South Africa currently has ‘red rescue’ package, 
as distinct from the emphasis on ‘green stimulus’ in Europe; ‘green’ often being a 
short-hand for climate action.
1.2.2.2 Funding sources 
Many South African’s wondered from where the money will come, given that the 
Finance Minister had already had a challenging task in balancing an ‘austerity 
budget’ during his budget speech on 26 February 2020 (Mboweni 2020a) – before 
COVID was factored in. President Ramaphosa indicated broadly that the R500 
billion socio-economic package would come from “reprioritisation of around 
R130 billion within the current budget” and the rest (R370 bn) to “be raised from 
both local sources, such as the Unemployment Insurance Fund, and from global 
partners and international finance institutions” (Ramaphosa 2020). The National 
Treasury document provides a breakdown of the funding sources, again with the 
conversation to Euros added for international comparison (but noting that exchange 
rate volatility is a challenge of its own, exacerbated by COVID).
TABLE 2
South Africa's COVID-19 social relief and 
economic support package, spending
Source: breakdown and ZAR from (Treasury 2020), EUR calculated at € 20 / 
ZAR 1
ZAR bn EUR bn
Health interventions R 20 € 1
Municipalities support R 20 € 1
Social grants R 50 € 3
Job support R 100 € 5
Wage guarantees R 40 € 2
Loan guarantees R 200 € 10
Tax and payment deferrals and 
holidays
R 70 € 4
Total R 500 € 25
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Note that the credit guarantee scheme (CGS) appears as the first line in both 
Table 1 and Table 2. CGS to support small medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) 
emerged in Europe in the 19th century and spread to over 100 countries over the 
20th century (Green 2003). In South Africa, the Small Enterprise Finance Agency 
(SEFA) offers CGS3 to SMME who cannot access finance due to lack of collateral. 
SEFA does not provide credit directly, but rather a range of credit guarantee 
products is made available to commercial banks and financial institutions. Is it not 
clear whether the R200 bn would flow via SEFA (would require further research).
1.2.2.3 Implications (initial take) 
South Africa currently intends to borrow R95 bn (EUR 5 bn) and has approached 
several DFIs. Some commentators have already indicated that the package may not 
be large enough (Makgetla 2020). Increased borrowing will add to the national debt. 
3 https://www.sefa.org.za/services/product/9
TABLE 3
Funding sources for South Africa's COVID-19 
social relief and economic support package
Source: breakdown and ZAR from (Treasury 2020), EUR calculated at € 20 / 
ZAR 1
† International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the New Development Bank
ZAR bn EUR bn
Credit Guarantee Scheme  R 200 € 10
Baseline reprioritisation  R 130 € 7
Borrowings from multilateral finance 
institutions and development banks† 
for business support, job creation and 
protection
 R 95 € 5
Additional transfers and subsidies from 
the social security funds
 R 60 € 3
Available funds in the Department 
of Social Development 2020/21 
appropriation
 R 15 € 1
Total R 500 € 25
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South Africa’s fiscal space was already virtually gone before the COVID crisis. 
During the first days of the national lockdown, Moody’s, the last rating agency 
that had not yet put South Africa on ‘junk status’, did so (BS 2020). Another, 
Fitch, further downgraded SA to lower notches. The country is not unique 
among developing countries: “Just when developing countries need to manage 
the pandemic, most have seen their fiscal space evaporate” (Hausman 2020). 
Hausman suggests that those who do not have fiscal space – most developing 
countries – borrow for the next two years as much as possible, and that the IMF 
is the only institution large enough. The IMF has mobilised emergency financing 
for 102 countries (as of 12 May 2020) (IMF 2020), with reported loans to SA at an 
interest rate of 1% (Naidoo 2020), but even then capital has to be repaid.
In this context, we need a recovery that is both red and green. All countries will 
be more indebted post-COVID. However, it is critical to distinguish between 
those where fiscal space is limited, while for others there is none left at all. Some 
countries will be able to ‘print money’ and others not. Printing money is inflationary 
if the underlying assets are not sound. This means that the choice whether richer 
countries and regions remain committed to global solidarity or choose economic 
nationalism (Harari 2020) is important in relation to debt. Some countries, possibly 
including South Africa, will need debt relief. 
While the just transition transaction does not directly address the coal legacy 
debt of Eskom, it improves the changes of returning the national utility to financial 
sustainability (or perhaps some of its divisions). In the post-COVID economy, a 
new role for international climate finance through just transition transactions is 
more relevant than ever. At least that is what the UCT team thinks and would like to 
discuss with other partners. 
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Divestment pressure reduces finance for fossil fuel infrastructure, presumably 
including high-emission electricity generation, while green finance flows into green 
infrastructure, such as renewable energy and other cleaner energy technologies. 
Transition finance is needed in the period approaching the tipping point (as RE gets 
cheaper than coal for electricity, but not yet in all sectors) and before all of the new 
sectors are financial self-sustaining. 
The just transition transaction is a proposed multi-billion dollar performance-based 
ICF transaction to support and accelerate South Africa’s just energy transition 
(Tyler 2019). The opportunity for the design of the JTT arises from DFI mandates 
to fund a just transition in support of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change 
(ibid). Also, SA has been identified as a key focus country for demonstrating 
globally replicable just transition models (Meridian Economics 2020)South Africa is 
a key emerging economy with anticipated high emissions growth, and the electricity 
sector is a major contributor to its current total GHG emissions (DEA, 2018). This 
makes the deal important for enhancing mitigation ambition.
The JTT proposal is particularly significant for ICF because of the unprecedented 
scale of the deal (Cohen 2019b). At the heart of the deal is the use of ICF to catalyse 
systemic carbon reductions and incentivize domestic commercial investments. 
It creates a highly innovative use of ICF to address socio-political and economic 
barriers to achieving climate and development goals. The deal also sets up financial 
flows to fund socio-economic aspects of a just energy transition in South Africa 
through the creation of a Just Transition Fund (Tyler 2019). 
Conditions for the JTT ICF include the structural reforms in the power sector, 
financial turnaround for Eskom and on accelerated phase-down of coal power 
carbon emissions (ibid). These pre-conditions for the transaction seek to address 
Just transition: 
internationally and 
in South Africa 
1.3
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the political impasse related to the energy transition and job losses across the coal 
industry and concerns about resources to address socio-economic issues, and the 
question of the future form of Eskom and whether it will exist as a public or private 
company.
Broader domestic support for the JTT is sought through the factors that will help 
to improve the country’s economic outlook and thereby also political stability. 
SA’s rising fiscal deficit, increasing debt burden, low economic growth and sub-
investment grade (junk) status are directly associated with Eskom’s financial and 
operational problems. Political stability can be enhanced by measures to improve 
Eskom and SA’s investment ratings and to directly address labour union and civil 
society concerns about increased unemployment as a result of the privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises 
The value of the JTT strategy can be understood within the context of domestic 
challenges to decarbonize the electricity sector and conceptualisation of a Just 
Transition in South Africa. While the concept of a just transition is increasingly used 
in international climate (including ICF) discussions, the meaning and approach 
differs in different contexts. For this reason, in this case study we seek to first 
understand ‘just transition’ as it is framed internationally, and what is called for 
as part of a Just Transition in South Africa. The following sub-sections highlight 
domestic barriers to transforming the energy sector within South Africa and 
considers some potential financial instruments to overcome these challenges. 
Having considered these factors, we provide an answer the question: What is JT 
transaction in terms of the overall concept and high-level elements, and what 
was the process to develop it? Our answer (not ‘the’ answer) to this question 
forms part of addressing the overall research question and the first sub-question, in 
section 1.3 above.
1.3.1 What is Just Transition? International 
interpretation 
In the international context, conversations about just transition arise from the 
recognition that responses to climate change that bring about both opportunities 
and challenges. The initial conceptualisation of a “just transition” is attributed North 
American trade union demands for support for workers who faced losing jobs in the 
1990s due to policies to prevent air and water pollution (ILO 2015; Rosemberg 2010; 
Smith 2017b, 2017a). 
The concept of a “just transition” is now entrenched in international sustainable 
development and climate fora. The Paris Agreement preamble forefronts “the 
imperative of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and 
quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities” (UNFCCC 
2015). 
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The UN International Labour Organisation (ILO) Guidelines for a just transition 
towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all (ILO 2015) 
highlight the needs of the workforce and the creation of decent work and green 
jobs as part of any just transition (ILO, 2015). The ILO describes characteristics of 
a JT, including sufficient planning, the integration in implementing all sustainable 
development policy, the need for well-managed process, and for the inclusion of 
meaningful social dialogue at all levels to bring about fair burden sharing and to 
ensure that nobody is left behind (ILO 2018). At the COP24 climate conference in 
Katowice in Poland, some Heads of State adopted the ‘Solidarity and Just Transition 
Silesia Declaration’ reiterating the “imperatives of a just transition of the workforce 
and the creation of decent work and quality jobs” (HoSG, 2018).
A just transition in a modern society would be equitable and characterised by 
distributive fairness and justice – to the extent that this is possible. It requires that 
the transformational change to low-carbon economies in response to the climate 
crisis in a manner that “no one is left behind” (UN 2015). The implication of this 
more equitable approach is that it is more likely to be more broadly supported.
1.3.2 What is Just Transition – a South Africa 
interpretation 
In the South African context, descriptions of a just transition include a broader 
economic and social target because they explicitly recognize that fossil-fuel 
economy transformation impacts will ripple across regions and the economy. 
The loose framing of the international conceptualization (outlined above) - that 
transition to a lower carbon economy should not impose excessive losses 
on workers and fossil fuel dependent communities, but that it should create 
opportunities for them – is accepted.
A key distinction of the use of the term ‘just transition’ in SA is that in SA a JT 
places strong emphasis on the need to address societal issues of poverty and 
inequality as a priority (Montmasson-Clair 2019; Strambo, Burton & Atteridge 2019; 
Swilling & Annecke 2012; Winkler 2018). It recognises links between poverty and 
equality, and the historic and current structure of the SA economy and its dominant 
means and modes of production. Recognition of these links moves the conversation 
beyond that of active labour market policies - green jobs, social protection and 
retraining -, even to debating reform of the current socio-economic system (Scholtz 
et al. 2019). 
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The risks of replicating or intensifying poverty and inequality through processes of 
transformation are also recognised, as are opportunities for more equitable societal 
outcomes, specifically for employment and redistribution of power and resources, 
and to carve an alternative development path (Scholtz et al. 2019). Some voices 
speak of ‘greening of the developmental state’ - a call for government to pursue 
all economic opportunities arising from decarbonization (Swilling, Musango & 
Wakeford 2016)-, and for rejuvenation of local economies that have become fossil-
fuel dependent (Montmasson-Clair 2019). The extent of impacts (positive and 
negative) means that a just transition should engage stakeholders and planning 
across the economy and society (Montmasson-Clair 2019).
Opportunities for more distributively equitable and environmentally just economic 
activities are not limited only to renewable energy enterprise. These can be 
identified through inclusive multi-stakeholder collaboration processes (Strambo , 
Burton & Atteridge 2019). These multi-stakeholder processes will create forums to 
build common understanding about what a just transition means (ibid), and about 
what interventions to enact and on who manages them (Montmasson-Clair 2019). 
The conceptualisation of a ‘just transition’ for South Africa reveals a strong appetite 
for transformation of the socio-economic relations that structure its energy system. 
In the words of the President: 
In SA, a just transition tends to focus on the transformation of the electricity 
sector’s dependence on coal-fuel electricity plants. There in increasing recognition 
of broader dimensions of the just transition, yet most public debate remains 
on inequalities in moving away from coal (Cock 2019a). The IRP 2019 for future 
electricity procurement mandates that most of all new electricity generating 
capacity will be provided via new renewable energy, though most existing capacity 
remains based on coal (DoE 2019). Figure 4 shows almost half the new capacity 
coming from wind (49%), with another fifth from grid-connected solar photovoltaics 
(PV). The new capacity additions of hydroelectricity, which would be imported from 
Inga in the Democratic Republic of Congo, though this is subject to high uncertainty. 
“As part of ensuring a just transition we will need to 
put measures in place that plan for workforce reskilling 
and job absorption, social protection and livelihood 
creation, incentivising new green sectors, diversifying coal 
dependent regional economies, and developing labour and 
social plans as and when ageing coal-fired power plants are 
decommissioned.” 
Ramaphosa 2019
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Also note that Figure 4 includes storage, which does not generate electricity, the 
importance of which will increase as shares of renewable energy increase. At the 
same time, the IRP still includes plans to build another 1.5 GW of new coal (beyond 
Medupi and Kusile), which would increase GHG emissions; but neither nuclear nor 
concentrating solar power up to 2030.
New renewable energy makes up 69% of new generating capacity in SA’s electricity 
plan, the IRP. The plan will have to be implemented and RE faces challenges in the 
political economy, as described above. The IRP is an important domestic mitigation 
measure, mentioned in SA’s first NDC. 
Achieving the mitigation target range in the NDC and potentially increasing ambition 
in SA’s next NDC face significant challenges. These are the very challenges that a 
JTT needs to overcome.
Coal  1.5GW 
Gas & diesel  3GW 
Imported hydro  2.5GW 
Storage  2.1GW 
Solar PV  6GW 
Wind  14.4GW 
CSP  0GW 











New capacity added in IRP 2019 (GW)
Source: Authors' own graph, based on data in IRP 2019 (DoE 2019b) 
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1.3.3 Transition for communities and    
workers dependent on coal 
On the one hand, labour unions are in general support of a just transition, however 
their viewpoints differ on what this means for reformation of the economy and 
industrial relations (Cock 2019b). They share high levels of concern about the 
inevitable job losses associated transitioning away from coal, especially in the light 
of existing high levels of unemployment and poverty. These losses include from 
coal mines, through coal-fired power plants and coal-to-liquids, to beneficiation 
downstream.
Concerns about workers losing jobs and communities losing livelihoods have 
mobilised vocal support for coal, and against anticipated coal sector job losses as 
a result of renewables procurement under the REI4P. In March 2017, truck drivers 
representing the Coal Transporters Forum blocked major highways entering 
Pretoria in protest after Eskom announced planned coal plant closures to address 
excess generation capacity resulting from the REI4P (ENCA 2017). The National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM) similarly threatened a national protest against the 
plan (ANA reporter 2017). Then, in the face of increasing pressure from climate 
change activist movements, NUM proposed that ‘clean coal’, using potentially 
emerging technologies like Carbon Capture and Storage’, might better serve both 
climate and labour interests (Cock 2019a).
Labour support for threatened coal workers reached the High Court in 2018 with 
a NUMSA, joined by COSATU (one of the three main union federations), applied to 
stop the signing of PPAs under the REI4P, for the reason that it would likely lead 
to coal power plant closures and job losses affecting 30,000 families (LegalBrief 
2018). This move prompted environmental activist organisation Greenpeace to 
accuse NUMSA of a move to sabotage renewable energy in favour of coal (Alfreds 
2018). In fairness, NUMSA opposes any privatisation of national electricity supply, 
renewables or coal. Rather, it promotes the notion of energy democracy, taking 
the ideological position that the energy sector is part of ‘the commons’ with social 
ownership and democratic control (Cock 2019a; Scholtz et al. 2019).
Indeed, SOEs, and by extension Eskom and coal, are perceived to be the leading 
instruments for enacting the ‘developmental state’. The concept of the SA 
government as a developmental state means that it’s focus is on fighting poverty 
and deprivation AND the expansion of economic opportunities of all its citizens 
(Mbeki 2006). The call for a stronger role by the developmental state is thought 
to be strong now, notably for national interest in the energy sector (Swilling 2020). 
As such, some unions are categorically opposed to privatisation of SOE’s and 
to the unbundling of Eskom, which they believe might be a precursor to future 
privatisation and an ‘unjust transition’ (Scholtz et al. 2019).
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Sub-national government also takes on the role of the developmental state. For 
example, Mpumalanga Province had developed a Green Economy Development 
Plan focusing on interventions to support the just transition towards a low carbon 
and climate resilient economy and society. It explicitly recognises inequality of 
potential negative impacts and it states that, “The Just Transition strategy will be 
more biased towards protecting the most vulnerable members of our societies 
which include women, children, people with disabilities and the poor“ (Mtshweni-
Tsipane 2020).
One way of potentially addressing labour and environmental movements concerns 
and debates around the production of energy in a just transition might be through 
public ownership of renewables, especially for vulnerable communities. Labour 
unions and civil society are general agreement that ownership is important, 
but no commonly preferred models are identified (Scholtz et al. 2019). As one 
example, NUMSA has long called for socially owned renewables – a socialist 
conceptualisation of renewables that achieves energy supply, and provides 
equitable dividends to the communities and workers directly involved in the 
production and consumption of energy (NUMSA 2012). 
The literature provides examples of social or community ownership of renewables 
that can inform the debate (see section 2.2 below). Assessment of these examples 
highlights some resource needs, and possibly these needs might be met in part by 
a Just Transition Fund. Nonetheless, it should be noted that South African literature 
includes recommendation for further research into community ownership and 
specific examples in the context of a just transition for South Africa (Overy 2018).
The creation of renewables projects might create more sustainable livelihoods, 
but it might not bring a job for an individual worker in a coal plant. The 2018 jobs 
summit agreed on a presidential climate change co-ordinating commission to 
oversee a just transition, but little has been heard from it since.” (Winkler 2019). A 
raft of urgent and considered interventions are required to address the needs of 
workers and of regional economies dependent on coal, as a matter of urgency and 
before implementation of any coal decommissioning plan.
1.3.4 Institutions, instruments and actors 
that could meet the needs of workers and 
communities 
What interventions might a just transition package contain? Table 3 below contains 
potential interventions and elements for a just transition package for South Africa. 
These elements seek to address regional development challenges as well as 
declining economic activity in the coal sector (Burton, Marquard, and McCall 2019). 
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The interventions support addressing unemployment in coal regions as a priority, 
accompanied by structural support through investment in diversification of industry 
through building on already tested alternatives and economic specialization that 
builds on regional competitive advantages (Burton et al. 2019). A just transition 
would include not only workers in the coal supply chain, but also the discouraged 
unemployed, many of which are youths (ages 15-24) (ibid). It could respond to 
community calls for jobs and for unions, and decent, quality work (ibid). The coal 
value chain includes coal mines, coal-fired power stations, and down-stream 
beneficiation (SA-CRM 2013). In Gauteng and Mpumalanga, coal is also used in 
households for various end uses, and associated with indoor air pollution and health 
impacts (Nkambule and Blignaut 2012; Riekert and Koch 2012; von Schirnding, 
Yach, and Klein 1991). 
The interventions respond to community and labour and social justice movement 
calls for restoring “soft attractiveness factors” like clean air and water to the 
regions, and to demands for food security, access to public transport and healthy 
environments (Burton et al. 2019). 
Table 3 below illustrates some of the many actors that might play important roles 
in planning and implementing a just transition package. This list is not exhaustive. 
Further thinking will be needed on institutional reforms and financing options (ibid). 
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TABLE 4
Potential elements of a just transition package for South Africa
Instrument  
or goal Rationale Example where possible
Institutional innovation  
and financing option Research required Actors








Worker regional transfer programmes 
with on-the-job retraining. In-company 
redeployment. Retraining options for 
workers with transferable skills. Integrated 
multi-purpose retraining programmes. 
Natural retirement, voluntary redundancy, 
or bridge to pension for older workers
Eskom/tariffs, mining houses, 
grant funding, national fiscus
Contextual factors 
on work- force age, 
skills, options/costs 
of early retirement, 
redeployment, 
retraining
Workers, Eskom and 







youth to obtain skills for 
job interviews, practice, 
placements
http://harambee.co.za/
National Business Initiative’s employability 
scheme
Grant/philanthropic funding, 















Geographical procurement of utility-scale 
renewable energy in former mining areas 
(coal and gold)
Innovation in REIPPPP 
procurement rules required for 
locational allocation. 






allocation, jobs created 
per GWh, skills needed, 
potential or pathways 
for existing power 
stations workers to 
migrate into new plants
Municipalities, SAREC, 
DMRE, banks, National 
Treasury
Instrument  
or goal Rationale Example where possible
Institutional innovation  
and financing option Research required Actors
3. Improvement of local infrastructure; location of innovation or energy transition projects; related diversification
Residential 
rooftop solar
Income generation for low-
income households and 
social ownership model
Feed-in tariffs provided for low-income 
households to sell electricity to the grid
Institutional innovation in 
energy markets at municipal 











National Treasury – and 
Provincial Departments, 
CoGTA, SALGA and local 
NGOs and communities
4. “Smart specialisation”: supporting the growth of economic activities that build on an assessment of the region’s strengths and competitive advantages. 
In coal regions, this could include existing power, rail or port infrastructure, land availability, cultural and industrial heritage, skills of the local workforce, 
existing industries with growth potential, etc.






requires very rapid and 
high roll-out of renewable 
energy: 172 GW from 
2020–2050.
Leverage skilled workforce
No extant example in Mpumalanga, 
existing assembly and component 
capacity developed during REIPPPP but 
some closed/decreased after REIPPPP 
procurement hiatus
Procurement rule change 





GWh, skills needed, 
potential or pathways 
for existing power 
stations workers
SAREC, DTI, DMRE,





close links to markets, 
good transport links, and 
experienced industrial 
workforce
Need research on place-based 
opportunities for Mpumalanga and potential 
competitive advantage in existing and new 
sectors
Increased support for existing 
manufacturing capabilities
Concessional/ developmental 
and commercial finance, 
dependent on sector analyses
Detailed analysis of 
economic, innovative 
and scientific potential 
of different sectors, and 
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TABLE 4 [continued]
Instrument  
or goal Rationale Example where possible
Institutional innovation  
and financing option Research required Actors
3. Improvement of local infrastructure; location of innovation or energy transition projects; related diversification
Residential 
rooftop solar
Income generation for low-
income households and 
social ownership model
Feed-in tariffs provided for low-income 
households to sell electricity to the grid
Institutional innovation in 
energy markets at municipal 











National Treasury – and 
Provincial Departments, 
CoGTA, SALGA and local 
NGOs and communities
4. “Smart specialisation”: supporting the growth of economic activities that build on an assessment of the region’s strengths and competitive advantages. 
In coal regions, this could include existing power, rail or port infrastructure, land availability, cultural and industrial heritage, skills of the local workforce, 
existing industries with growth potential, etc.






requires very rapid and 
high roll-out of renewable 
energy: 172 GW from 
2020–2050.
Leverage skilled workforce
No extant example in Mpumalanga, 
existing assembly and component 
capacity developed during REIPPPP but 
some closed/decreased after REIPPPP 
procurement hiatus
Procurement rule change 





GWh, skills needed, 
potential or pathways 
for existing power 
stations workers
SAREC, DTI, DMRE,





close links to markets, 
good transport links, and 
experienced industrial 
workforce
Need research on place-based 
opportunities for Mpumalanga and potential 
competitive advantage in existing and new 
sectors
Increased support for existing 
manufacturing capabilities
Concessional/ developmental 
and commercial finance, 
dependent on sector analyses
Detailed analysis of 
economic, innovative 
and scientific potential 
of different sectors, and 
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TABLE 4 [continued]
Instrument  
or goal Rationale Example where possible
Institutional innovation  
and financing option Research required Actors
Agriculture and 
agro-processing
Leverage high potential 
arable land in Mpumalanga
Bio and fibre crops on rehabilitated land
Agriculture value chain assessments and 
agro- processing hub (Nkomazi)
Concessional, DFI and 
commercial finance, industrial 
policy incentives





Agbiz, IDTT/ CCRED, 
Agri-SA, National and 
provincial departments 
of Agriculture, DTI, 
TIPS, Minerals to metals 
(UCT), MEGA
5. Improvement of local infrastructure; improvement of “soft attractiveness” factors; location of public sector activities in the region; smart specialisation
Education and 
literacy
Address low literacy rates 
and long-term skills deficits
Teacher training for literacy,
USAID Reading readiness programme
ECD programmes Community college 
project University campuses
Grant funding
Social and Labour Plans
Socio-economic development 
spend from new RE plants in 
region
Department of Higher 
Education and Training
Role of existing 
educational in- 
situations and existing 
barriers
Mpumalanga University 
and Dept of Education
University of Pretoria 















for mining- affected 
communities, address 
water scarcity and 
pollution etc.
Utilise rehab funds for 
large- scale employment of 
local communities
Potential for commercial 
opportunities in degraded 
land and agriculture
Mine Water Co-ordinating Body Green 
Engine Room
Biofibre economy on degraded land
Catchment clearing and ecological systems 
services for employment
Grounded
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TABLE 4 [continued]
Instrument  
or goal Rationale Example where possible
Institutional innovation  
and financing option Research required Actors








Just transition means more 
than just a technology 
transition. Public transport 
is key to meeting mitigation 
and economic justice goals
Government expenditure DFI
Commercial
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In the context elaborated above, the case study will explore the following research 
questions: 
 › How can climate finance-policy packages transform SA’s energy 
infrastructure and ensure a just transition in SA’s electricity sector? 
 » What catalytic role might international climate finance have 
in the SA electricity sector in crisis, a climate crisis that 
requires the accelerated phase out of coal globally and the 
triple challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequality?
 » What institutional innovation in ownership models would 
support renewable energy, both in terms of buy-in and scale? 
These questions have implications for Eskom, the national fiscal framework and 
will become more pointed with the COVID crisis (the latter occurred well after 
the design and half the work on this case study). While national in focus, the just 
transition will have a particularly geographical focus in Mpumalanga province. 
To explore these questions, we adopt an inter-disciplinary, “mixed methods” 
approach, appropriate to the novelty of the topic and seeking to undertake the 
research rigorously (Sovacool, Axsen, and Sorrell 2018). We draw on qualitative 
and quantitative information in existing reports; hold in-depth discussions with 
key informants, including in two national workshops (one at the design stage, in 
November 2019, and one at draft report, June 2020); conduct interviews to fill gaps 
and add additional information; and combine this information into a rich case study. 
The quantitative information includes results from previous energy-economy-
environment modeling, but we will not undertake new model runs. 
The research does not draw on any specific theoretical framework. Sustainability 
Research questions, 
design, methods and 
working definitions 
1.4
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transitions research sought “to conceptualize and explain how radical changes 
can occur in the way societal functions are fulfilled” (Köhler et al. 2019a), but has 
had limited focus on labour and none (that we know of) on transition finance. In 
reviewing its work over the last decade, this community of practice acknowledges 
that themes salient to the just transition have received insufficient attention: “Social 
inequality, poverty and lack of access to modern services such as sanitation or 
education in low-income economies might be considered more important than 
global environmental rationales such as climate change” Historical-cultural activity 
theory has developed methodologies for formative interventions and studied 
transformative agency (Sannino and Engeström 2018), but focuses at the level of 
activity, not at national scale. Actor-network theory explains change in social and 
material conditions in relation to networks of relationships (Latour 2005), but tend 
to describe change ex post, whereas we seek to understand a transition being 
developed and its future implications. There is no single “theory of just transition”. 
We do not seek to develop one here, as the focus is applied. 
In order to aid understanding and rigour of analysis, we clarify some terminology. 
What explain what we mean by climate finance and various qualifiers; debt 
and financial instruments; and additionality. The section concludes with a brief 
discussion of a salient new concept, transition finance. 
Climate finance is finance for mitigation and adaptation. In more detailed terms, 
climate finance aims at reducing emissions, and enhancing sinks of greenhouse 
gases and aims at reducing vulnerability of, and maintaining and increasing the 
resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate change impacts. 
The UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance continues work on operational 
definitions of climate finance (SCF 2018), and our working definitions is intended 
to be broadly consistent with the SCF. International climate finance means climate 
finance flowing between countries. 
Distinctions have been made in recent climate negotiations between providing 
and mobilising climate finance. These distinctions continue to be contested, and 
some historical context is important. Under the UNFCCC, the richer countries 
(Annex II) agreed to provide finance “to meet the agreed full incremental costs of 
implementing measures” by developing countries (UNFCCC, 1992: Article 4.3). 
Much of the spending by the Global Environment Facility as the operating entity 
was on mitigation, for example renewable energy which was more expensive than 
alternatives – hence incremental costs. For some technologies, relative prices have 
shifted, while for others, incremental costs are still an obstacle (e.g. concentrating 
solar power; zero carbon steel). 
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Under the Paris Agreement, the obligations for developed countries to provide 
finance continue (Article 9.1), other countries are encouraged to also provide 
support voluntarily (Article 9.2) and developed countries should lead in “mobilizing 
climate finance from a wide variety of sources” … progressing beyond previous 
efforts (Article 9.3) (UNFCCC 2015b). The decision adopting the Agreement 
provides that Parties “shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 
100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing 
countries” before 2025 (UNFCCC 2015a). Article 2.1 (c ) aims to make “finance 
flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate-resilient development”; it is important to note that this is the context of 
global temperature limits (2.1 a) of well below 2 °C and 1.5 °C, adaptation (2.1 b) and 
all as a global response “in the context of sustainable development and efforts to 
eradicate poverty” (UNFCCC 2015b). Hence climate finance is linked to sustainable 
development, even specifying poverty. The just transition transaction is relevant to 
international climate finance. 
Terminology related to debt and financial instruments in this paper uses the 
following working definitions: 
 › A loan is money lent by a financial institution to another organisation. 
The organisation receiving the loan incurs a debt which has to 
repay the loan, the principal amount lent to it and interest on the 
loan. In simple terms, a loan has to be repaid with interest. 
 › Bonds are a fixed income instrument typically issued by government 
or a corporate entity, which incurs a debt to the bond holder. Bond 
issuers must repay the principal at a later date, the maturity date. 
In some cases, bond issuers must also pay interest traditionally at a 
fixed interest rate known as the coupon rate, commonly paid out twice 
per year. In simple terms, bonds have to be repaid at a later date. 
 › Equity injections are investment of capital into a company or institution. 
The institution is typically in financial crisis and requires capital to lower 
debt ratios and / or stimulate growth. Equity injections are on the fiscal 
balance sheet as expenditure, but are not repaid. In the SA context, the 
institutions are state-owned enterprises and for this case study, Eskom. 
National government is the 100% shareholder of Eskom (via DPE) and 
equity injections are provided by National Treasury. In simple terms, 
equity injections are not repaid and are also known as ‘bail-outs’. 
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The just transition transaction funds additional costs of phasing out coal and a just 
transition. The word ‘additional’ raises the question of how fast coal would have 
been decommissioned anyway – a question of additionality. We know from the CDM 
debates that additionality is a counter-factual, that can be understood with some 
approaches, but cannot be nailed down quantitatively – and will be an issue under 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement as well (Ellis et al. 2007; Kartha, Lazarus, and 
Lefranc 2005; Michaelowa et al. 2019; Schneider 2009; Winkler et al. 2001). For this 
paper, we assume that additional decommissioning means faster than the baseline 
in the official electricity plan (see section 1.1.4). In principle, we should avoid double 
counting of mitigation or finance (Schneider et al. 2019; UNFCCC 2015b). 
A new concept of “transition finance” has been introduced in a paper informing the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The concept is developed in 
support of the SDGs and Agenda 2030. “Transition is the journey to sustainable 
development, and transition finance the financing of that journey. The analysis of 
transition finance focuses on the evolution and interaction of public (ODA and OOF) 
and private (FDI and remittances) sources of finance” (Piemonte et al. 2019). 
The paper sets out different milestones and tipping points, exploring the change 
over time and in different countries (by income group) of the interaction of public 
(official development assistance and other official flows) and private (foreign direct 
investments and remittances) sources of finance. “Applying these concepts to the 
more granular level of sector analysis (e.g. social sectors, energy), it appears that 
transition finance flows differently to different sectors, with longer dependence on 
ODA of certain sectors like health (but also sharper decline in assistance), resulting 
in major transition finance gaps.” 
The JTT could be understood as a form of transition finance. We turn in the 
following section to analysis of the just transition transaction.
FIGURE 8
Climate finance as transition finance, bridging the gap between 
pressure to divest from coal and rise of green finance 




and a just transition
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Coal-fired power has dominated the energy supply, for most of electricity and 
30% of liquid fuels. In South Africa’s electricity sector, wind and solar PV are now 
the least-cost options for new power plants (see section 1.1.3 above). The REI4P 
was started with public funding, but most investment in capital expenditure is 
private. Electric vehicles are starting to enter the SA market, though not yet least-
cost. Nevertheless, these changes in relative prices raise the question what role 
international climate finance might play in transforming SA’s energy infrastructure 
further? A just transition, leaving no-one behind, is sine qua non for acceptability in 
a country with persistent inequality and high levels of poverty (see 1.1.1), which will 
be exacerbated by COVID-19 (see 1.2.2). 
'Least cost’ alone is proving an insufficient condition to bring about transformation 
of energy sector, at the pace and scale required for South Africa to make more 
ambitious contributions to global efforts at mitigation. What is the role of climate 
finance in accelerating a phase out of coal in a just transition of SA’s electricity 
sector? 
The focus of this case study - a just transition transaction - needs to be understood 
in broader contexts. Accelerating mitigation is essential in the context of urgent 
action and rapid emission reductions being required to address the climate crisis 
(IPCC 2018). Yet more stringent mitigation targets in the South Africa context will 
fail to be achieved, if the challenges to energy infrastructure are not considered. 
A just transition adds a crucial social component to an energy transition, the 
transformation of energy infrastructure. The focus here is on the electricity sector, 
which is a critical part of the just transition in a broader sense (the latter also 
including other forms of energy, and adaptation to the impacts of climate change). 
The electricity sector faces a complex set of challenges, going well beyond techno-
economic solutions. 
In undertaking technical analysis for the just transition transaction, Meridian 
Economics (2020) show the domestic problem complexes coming under 
increased external pressures.
In Figure 9, climate change is a driver on a coal-based electricity sector as are 
renewable energy technologies in which prices have fallen internationally and in SA. 
Note that finance is not explicit in the domestic ‘bubbles’ on the right hand side, 
though there are many connections to finance implicitly.
The electricity sector faces a set of complex problems, from security of supply, 
operational inefficiencies, divided view on unbundling a vertically-integrated utility, 
no vision for the end-state of the sector and – the elephant in the room – massive 
debt. During the Zuma administration, Eskom was also subject to “state capture” 
(Public Protector 2016) considered by a group of academics a key part ‘betrayal 
of the promise’ of post-Apartheid South Africa (State Capacity Research Project 
2017). Together, these multiple problems amount to a sector that was in crisis, even 
before the COVID crisis hit South Africa in early 2020. 
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It would go far beyond the scope of this case study to address all the policy 
problems of the electricity sector. A just transition transaction cannot on its own 
deliver solutions to all the challenges in the sector, nor deliver all the mitigation 
effort that SA should be making to make a fair contribution to limit temperature 
increase to “well below 2 °C” and pursuing efforts for 1.5°C (UNFCCC 2015b).
The focused question is what catalytic role might international climate finance have 
in the SA electricity sector in crisis, a climate crisis that requires the accelerated 
phase out of coal globally and the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty and 
inequality? This is a critical part of the overall research question outlined in section 
1.4 above. The role of international climate finance (ICF) is most catalytic in the 
form of a just transition transaction (JTT), which funds the accelerated phase 
out of coal and the just transition itself. This means it addresses a complex set of 
challenges, not resolving them all but creating possibilities of change. Given the 
overall policy trilemma in the previous paragraph and the context in section 0 
above, we argue that simply ‘adding ICF’ does not lead to better policy outcomes. 
A transaction that aimed only at accelerating mitigation would, we argue, fail. By 
better, we mean outcomes that address the underlying challenges, the root causes 
of the problem. A more radical analysis requires understanding how changes 
in the policy space might be encouraged through climate finance. This 
requires understanding of the political and institutional environment. 
FIGURE 9
Intersecting domestic problem complexes come under further 
transition-related external pressure
Source: Meridian Economics (2020)
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2.1.1 Key elements of the problem of a    
just transition and decarbonisation 
South Africa’s the parastatal electricity company Eskom has had a monopoly on 
electricity supply, controls transmission and more than half of distribution (see 
1.1.3). However, the utility has faced significant operational, structural and financial 
problems that have intensified over recent years. These challenges have brought 
into sharper focus structural problems in the electricity market. The just transition 
transaction has the potential to help solve some of these challenges. 
2.1.1.1 Operational problems 
South Africa has experienced periods of electricity shortages in recent years, (2007 
-2008, 2014-2015, February – March 2019, December 2019 – March 2020). These 
shortages have multiple causes including planned and unplanned maintenance, and 
technical defects in new coal plants. An overarching cause of this was the delay in 
commissioning new capacity in the 2000s, and the delays experienced in bringing 
new capacity online (Pickering, 2010; Martin and Winkler, 2014; Baker et al., 2015; 
Eberhard and Godinho, 2017)
Eskom group annual results for the year ended 31 March 2019 reveal problems 
concentrated in generation activities as a result of these technical factors like 
age in some plants and poor construction in the case of Medupi and high price 
coal supply contracts (Eskom 2019a). Some of the oldest plants in the coal fleet 
are recommissioned previously mothballed plants and this makes the system 
unreliable and unpredictable. Cost cutting on maintenance in recent years has led 
to a demanding maintenance schedule for, more rolling blackouts in the first half 
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of 2020 and appointment of a specialist to implement ‘philosophy maintenance’ 
(Creamer 2019, 2020), though the coronacrisis led to reduced demand during a 
national shutdown. 
In addition to these operational challenges, there are four structural issues. By 
structural issues, we mean challenges with electricity tariffs; a previous monopoly 
struggling with competition from IPPs; corruption; and non-payment.
2.1.1.2 Structural challenges 
The first structural challenge relates to electricity tariffs. Tariffs for Eskom and 
municipal distributors are set by the National Energy Regulator of South Africa 
(NERSA). For municipalities, NERSA publishes guidelines, each municipality 
then applies for approval of its annual tariffs to NERSA, which then considers 
and approves them. For Eskom, NERSA has a published methodology for multi-
year price determinations (MYPD) (NERSA 2016). Historically, electricity tariffs 
have been kept relatively low, for complex historical reasons (Marquard 2006) 
that enabled Eskom to claim to have the cheapest electricity in the world (Eskom 
2020), as well as political imperatives to keep tariffs low for industry and newly 
connected and typically poor residential customers. Electrification has been one 
of main success stories of the post-Apartheid government has been electrification, 
increasing access to electricity from around one-third in 1990 to 87% in 2017 
(StatsSA 2019) and reportedly reaching 90% by 2018 (ANA reporter 2018). Poorer 
households have benefitted from electrification, and a free basic electricity tariff 
(FBET) make physical access affordable. Yet further increases in Eskom electricity 
tariffs are politically unpalatable. A counter-vailing consideration is that tariffs have 
not been fully cost-reflective. In recent years, NERSA has awarded tariff increases 
below the rates that Eskom applied for in their MYPD applications. Eskom generally 
will pass on tariff increases to its customers and to municipalities who serves 
non-Eskom customers in their distribution areas. If tariffs are insufficient to cover 
Eskom’s cost, as a state-owned enterprise which is 100% owned by government, 
Eskom will approach Treasury for funding. The fiscus is funded by taxes, so this 
means that taxpayers ultimately pay. Therefore, building new electricity generating 
capacity is paid either by customers or taxpayers. 
Another structural challenge is that Eskom has historically had a monopoly on 
electricity supply (Marquard 2006). With significant capacity added under the 
REI4P (but a smaller share of electricity generated), Eskom has been reluctant 
to purchase power from IPPs, as it needs funds for its own cashflow. While bid 
tariffs have fallen sharply over the several round to around 5 US$c/kWh (Kruger 
& Eberhard 2018), tariffs in the earlier bid windows were higher – and still have to 
be paid for typically 20-year-long power purchase agreements. There is no serious 
doubt, however, that grid-connected new wind and solar PV are now cheaper than 
new coal or nuclear power in South Africa. 
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A third structural challenge is that Eskom became associated with corruption 
related to coal supply – the ‘state capture’ referred to above. Detailed analysis of 
the implication for Eskom were compiled as a resource for Parliament’s public 
enterprises inquiry, civil society, journalists & engaged citizens (Eberhard & 
Godinho 2017a). Merely providing more funding to Eskom, without improving 
efficiency of its use, preventing corruption or misspending, will not help address 
problems in maintenance, cost-plus mines, or now in new plant. 
Fourthly, Eskom has structural problem with non-paying customers. Non-payment 
by some municipal distributors and many Soweto residents lead to financial losses 
of R30 billion (DPE 2019). A particular challenge to a Just Transition is that several 
municipalities in Mpumalanga are among those owing payments to Eskom, and 
given poor financial health, might not be able to pay IPPs either. The President 
restated the principle that those who use electricity must pay for it, and Ministers 
and officials tried to resolve non-payment. Eskom has attempted to reduce supply 
but been challenged in court (DPE 2019). 
2.1.1.3 Financial constraints 
Eskom’s financial problems have been at least two decades in the making (Eskom 
n.d.). As outlined under the structural issues above, tariff increases have been 
insufficient to cover costs. According to Eskom’s CEO, current tariff average is 
approximately 23% below the average price in the IRP 2019, creating a revenue 
shortfall in the region of R67 billion a year (de Ruyter 2020a). Borrowing for the two 
large coal-fired power plants, Medupi Power Station (4 788MW) and Kusile Power 
Station (4 800MW), together reportedly costs more than two and a half times 
the initial budget because of delays and cost overruns (Creamer 2019). Technical 
problems at both plants are cause for ongoing inefficiencies and the plants are 
expected to be fully operational, Medupi from the end of 2020 and Kusile at the 
end of 2023 (de Ruyter 2020b). Failed revenue collection from municipalities and 
customers in Soweto township amounts to nearly R50 billion in April 2019) (de 
Ruyter 2020a)
Eskom’s annual debt interest payments are reported as between R28 bill to R20 
billion per annum (de Ruyter 2020a), and total debt service (interest and principal) 
for 2018/2019 is estimated at R63.3 billion (DPE 2019). Eskom is unable to meet 
these obligations; its debt service coverage ratio declined from 0.9 in 2018 to 0.5 
in 2019 (Eskom 2019a). This means that earnings before interest, tax, depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA) covered half of the total debt service for 2018/2019, 
while its interest rate coverage fell from 1.2 to 0.9 (ibid). In other words, EBITDA 
(including a Treasury bailout of R49 billion) covered 90% of the debt interest alone. 
Debt has built up, with debt securities and borrowings provided by lenders and 
investors (bond holders) increasing. "Eskom’s long-term debt is currently at R441 
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billion (as at March 2019), up from R255 billion in 2014. Over the next five years, 
interest payments of approximately R148 billion and debt repayments of R180 
billion are anticipated" (DPE 2019). 
Government provides Eskom with R350 billion of debt guarantee. In addition, 
National Treasury has provided equity injections or ‘bailouts’. Recently, these 
included allocation of R23 billion per year for three years in the February 2019 
budget (Mboweni 2019). The medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), which 
forms part of the MTBPS, committed this scale of equity injection funds in the 
near-term, amounting to cash injections of R69 billion ($ 4.7 billion) over three years 
(National Treasury 2019). In addition to the principal of the debt, interest payments 
add to the total cost, which “averages R85 billion over the next three years” 
(National Treasury 2019b), indicating interest payment of R5.3 bn per year. 
In the 2020 budget speech, the Finance Minister indicated that this scale of equity 
injection would continue for a total of ten years: Government will do “whatever it 
takes” to ensure a stable electricity supply. As I said, it is our number one task. 
We have allocated R230 billion over ten years to achieve the restructuring of the 
electricity sector” (Mboweni 2020a). The present value of the bailouts up to 2028 
is R167 billion, assuming an interest rate of 6% (though rates are variable under 
COVID).
Treasury has extended many guarantees for state-owned entities – not only Eskom, 
but also South African Airways, Transnet, the SA Broadcasting Corporation and 
Denel. The Medium Term Budget Policy Statement stated that “several large state-
owned companies (SOEs) are in crisis as a result of governance failures, poor 
operational performance and resultant unsustainable debt burdens” (National 
Treasury 2019). 
Eskom’s debt repayments include bank loans (the most senior in repayment 
priority), bond principal and interest. Loans account for approximately 40% of the 
debt in May 2019 (Burkhardt 2019). 
It is estimated that approximately R200 billion of Eskom’s current debt is foreign. 
Eskom is locked into large number of international transactions that it technically 
cannot service. This potentially stranded debt puts the SA economy at risk. Debt in 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has become a systemic problem for South Africa. 
The Minister of Finance in an earlier budget speech had already bluntly stated 
that the “SOEs pose very serious risks to the fiscal framework” (Mboweni 2019). 
Government has extended sovereign guarantees for R683 bn by 2019, of which 
Eskom had the largest facility at R350 bn, more than half (51%). 
Given the above, Eskom does not have access to capital markets. The debt of 
the state-owned enterprise has put increasing pressure on the fiscus. “If Eskom 
is unable to issue debt in the financial markets, or the cost of doing so becomes 
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prohibitively expensive, government may be called upon to provide further support 
to enable financial obligations to be met” (National Treasury 2019b)”. The Ministers 
of Finance and Public Enterprises have increasingly indicated that bailouts are 
conditional on greater 'operational efficiency'), and setting time-lines on unbundling, 
seeking to resolve operational and structural challenges (see also section 1.1.3 
above). Already severely challenged to the extent of a financial crisis, Eskom 
struggles to raise further debt in the context of global coal disinvestment.
2.1.1.4 Potential finance mechanisms to address this   
finance gap
Alternatives financial mechanisms that might be employed to separate the 
utility’s current financial circumstances from transformation of national energy 
infrastructure include the following:
Source: breakdown and ZAR from (Treasury 2020), EUR calculated at € 20 / ZAR 1
TABLE 5
Financial mechanisms that might close Eskom’s finance gap
Financial mechanism Actors High level implications
Market-based mechanisms
Market-based mechanisms might 
include an emissions trading system, 
as provided for by Article 6 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, within which foreign 
government(s) would buy emissions 
reductions brought about by accelerated 
decommissioning of coal-fueled power 
plants. 
 › national governments These emissions reductions 
would then be accounted for as 
contributions toward another 
country’s NDC. They could not 
be counted towards SAs NDC. 
Article 6 requires avoiding of 
double counting. 
Blended finance
Blended finance uses development 
finance to mobilize additional finance 
towards the sustainable development 
objectives in developing countries (OECD 
DAC 2017). This ability to blend different 
financial streams can significantly 
multiply the value of development 
finance. (in the JTT, blended finance has 
a particular meaning, see 2.1.3.2 below)
 › state sponsored 
investment funds




 › institutional investors
Blended finance might on the one 
hand add to transactional costs, 
on the other it brings flexibility 
when some of the investment 
needs falls outside the scope of 
donor grant and DFI strategic 
investment areas.
Institutional investment – local and 
international
Given national and Eskom ratings, 
investors would be seeking assurances in 
terms of capital assets. 
 › institutional investors
 › domestic financial 
institutions 
For this to be an option, SA / 
Eskom would need to overcome 
junk status. Domestic investment 
would assist in recovery of the 
domestic economy
52Financing a just transition transaction in South Africa
Financial mechanism Actors High level implications
Prescribed assets
The potential use of domestic pension 
and provident funds and other retirement 
savings to fund investments in the public 
sector might support economic growth.
 › National Treasury 
(Department)
 › Pension Investment 
Corporation Board
 › domestic financial 
institutions (pension 
funds?)
Local economists warn of risks 
inter alia to SA’s international 
credit ratings which would in turn 
undermine the country’s ability 
to raise foreign finance (Collocott 
2019)
Other risks include lower 
pension fund market returns, 
disincentives for discretionary 
savings, and a GEPF shortfall 
that would be covered by 
taxpayers. Investor confidence 
might suffer leading to foreign 
capital outflows and falls in 
private sector investment (ibid). 
SA’s international credit rating 
might fall and undermine access 
to foreign finance. 
Sovereign wealth fund
Possible funding sources include, 
the proceeds of spectrum allocation, 
petroleum, gas or mineral rights 
royalties, the sale of noncore assets, 
future fiscal surpluses and “money we 
set aside,” (Mboweni, 2020). 
A sovereign wealth fund is a potentially 
effective vehicle for managing windfalls 
like commodity price spikes.
 › Presidency
 › National Treasury 
Department
SA intends to establish a 
Sovereign Wealth Fund for saving 
and investment purposes, and 
the Finance Minister plans to 
submit a bill on this fund during 
the current parliament (Mboweni, 
2020). 
Debt swap
The state or lenders to Eskom or Eskom 
bondholders take on Eskom’s debt in 
return for part ownership (equity) of 
Eskom’s assets.
 › State investment 
body: PIC 
 › Development 
finance institutions 
such as: Industrial 
Development 
Corporation IDC), 
Bank of South Africa 
(DBSA)
The new holder of Eskom debt 
would hold executive powers 
within Eskom. 
Eskom has a debt : equity ratio 
of 3.1 (Eskom 2019a), so the 
new holder of all Eskom debt 
would be owed three times the 
equity (historically held 100% by 
government, Public Enterprises). 
Those taken on debt would hold 
majority stake in Eskom.
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2.1.2 Just transition transaction 
2.1.2.1 Financial flows 
The transaction can be understood by considering the high-level financial flows, 
illustrated in Figure 10 below). The JT transaction is premised on the principle 
that the international DFI community will make funding available in return 
for demonstrating accelerated reductions in carbon emissions to 2050. 
More specifically, the transaction would seek to secure both grant and 
concessionary (subsidised) loan facilities to SA from the DFI community 
on the pre-condition that SA accelerates decarbonisation of the electricity 
sector by bringing forward the dates of decommissioning for the most 
carbon-intense national power plants, thereby creating demand for new 
(renewable energy technology) generating capacity (Meridian Economics 
2020).
An important element of the transaction, from an international climate finance (ICF) 
perspective, is that the ICF funds an overwhelmingly coal-based utility to create the 
conditions for private financing of renewables. 
FIGURE 10
High level financial flows (concept)
Source: Meridian Economics (2020)
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The funding focuses on coal rather than on low carbon technologies. The deal not 
does not make an explicit conditionality the restructuring of the energy sector, 
unbundling of Eskom generation, transmission and distribution into separate 
companies. However, it is consistent with the introduction of an Independent 
Transmission and System Operator (ITSMO). The ITSMO would help with bringing 
in more IPPs, and elements of the JT transaction would reinvigorate the market for 
private capital investment in renewables. 
To attract international climate finance, the deal will have to show that there are 
significant emission reductions. If this were framed as conditionality, it would raise 
issues of sovereignty and dependencies, yet in practice it is clear that DFIs will wish 
to see the mitigation effect. This need not be accounted in the same way as tons 
would not be sold on a carbon market, but some commensurability between the 
scale of investment and scale of mitigation seems sensible. 
2.1.2.2 What exactly is the JTT funding? 
The JJT funds the additional costs of decommissioning coal (point 1, below) and the 
JT fund; but does not directly fund other means of repaying loans (point 2). In other 
words, the JTT will improve Eskom’s ability to manage its debt, but is not aimed at 
repaying stranded debt. However, by funding the accelerated decommissioning, the 
JTT enables Eskom to access capital markets again, albeit indirectly via a blended 
finance vehicle. For the purposes of this paper and for better understanding in the 
public debate, we propose the following short terms to distinguish different costs 
that need to be funded:
1. Additional costs of decommissioning coal
2. Fund other means of repaying loans
Each of the two parts is unpacked to convey the underlying issues.
2.1.2.2.1 Additional costs of decommissioning coal
Additional means faster than in in the baseline for GHG emissions in the electricity 
sector, assumed to be commission of coal in the IRP (see section 0).
The costs are the additional energy system costs of accelerating the 
decommissioning of coal, as modelled in a scenario in which coal-fired power 
stations or units within stations are retired earlier than in the IRP. (The JTT 
architecture also sees concessional part of financing support the JT Fund, but this 
is not related to the Eskom debt, which we are addressing here.)
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The just transition transaction means that international climate finance is used 
to accelerate the phase out of coal. While we have emphasised that no official 
emissions baseline exists (section 0), an illustrative baseline has been developed by 
Meridian Economics (2020), as shown in Figure 11.
2.1.2.2.2 Fund other means of repaying loans
The transaction provides blended finance in which international climate finance 
provides loans at concessionary loans, subordinated to loans from domestic 
financial institution at commercial rates. These loans flow into a blended finance 
vehicle (BFV) and are lent on to Eskom at near-commercial rates. In this way, 
Eskom regains access to capital markets. All loans have to be repaid. 
These are ‘other’ means of repaying loans because the usual ways of repaying loans 
are no longer viable. In the past, loans were repaid either by Eskom customers or 
SA taxpayers. 
A. Tariffs by customer:  
Loans would be paid back by accumulated revenues from earnings, which are 
the product of sales of electricity times a tariff. Electricity tariffs are regulated 
by the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA). In recent 
years, NERSA has consistently awarded tariff increases below the rates 
that Eskom applied for in multi-year price determinations (MYPD). Eskom 
generally will pass on tariff increases to its customers and to municipalities 
who serves non-Eskom customers in their distribution areas. Tariffs have 
not been fully cost-reflective (Eskom 2012). The success of electrification 
has made it politically difficult to raise residential tariffs (see 2.1.1.2) and 
key industrial customers have an interest in maintaining historically low 
tariffs. Further tariff increases are politically difficult and unlikely to be 
sufficient to cover operational costs and repay debt with interest. 
FIGURE 11
High level financial flows (concept)
Source: Meridian Economics (2020)
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B. Equity injections by Treasury: 
When increased tariffs funded by customers are not viable, Eskom 
would approach Treasury for equity injections. Equity injections are 
not repaid, as explained above. These funds are taken from the fiscus, 
and thus funded by taxpayer. The limits on further bailouts are a key 
part of the financial constraints faced by Eskom (see 2.1.1.3). If SOEs 
are unable to refinance debt, there may be major consequences for 
public finances (National Treasury 2019a). In this context, Treasury is 
hardly in a position to extend further sovereign debt guarantees. 
There are other financial instruments which would not directly provide Eskom with 
funds to repay loans, but improve its financial position in other ways.
C. Bonds:  
Eskom issues bonds – international, domestic > 1 year and domestic 
< 1 year (Eskom 2019b). One option is that the maturity date of 
existing Eskom bonds could be delayed, so that the principal would 
be repaid later. However, this does not provide new funding to repay 
loans, though it does improve Eskom’s overall debt : equity ratio. 
D. Bankruptcy: 
Commercial companies might declare bankruptcy. Creditors would 
either have to write off the loan entirely as a bad debt or those creditors 
first in line might be paid back x% on the Rand, taking a ‘haircut’. 
However, government provides Eskom with sovereign debt guarantees, 
so Eskom cannot easily approach their creditors in the same way. 
E. Selling assets: 
Theoretically, Eskom could sell assets to raise capital. However, given its 
poor financial position, operational inefficiencies, and structural challenges, 
Eskom seems unlikely to find buyers (see section 2.1.1.4 above).
2.1.2.3 Summary of what JTT funds and what it does not 
fund
The JTT, then, funds the additional costs of decommissioning coal. It does not 
fund means of repaying loans, in that international climate finance will not ‘bail out’ 
legacy coal debt. 
The JTT is a separate matter to another part of the Eskom debt problem, which 
is that neither increased tariffs nor further bailouts are viable. Other means of 
repaying loans are needed, in addition to the JTT (the options of bonds, bankruptcy 
or selling assets above, or pension funds or a SPV as discussed in section 2.1.3.4). 
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The JTT does contribute to by committing Eskom to a more viable business model 
(keeping it solvent as it decarbonises) and restoring its access to funding and 
thereby contributing to de-risking Eskom. The JTT working together with other 
instruments can thus potentially create a positive feedback loop to manage debt 
and the reduce the cost of finance. 
2.1.3 Financial architecture and institutional 
design of the just transition transaction 
The previous section has outlined what the Just Transition Transaction (JTT) is, 
how it might overcome challenges facing a transition in SA’s electricity sector and 
introduced the overall concept. But how might a JTT be designed? This section 
considers more details of financial architecture, the vehicles, actors and financial 
flows. It also outlines a key developmental component, a Just Transition Fund. 
Finally, it reflects on governance and institutional design relating to the JTT and the 
fund.
FIGURE 12
Debt service flows 
Source: Meridian Economics (2020)
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2.1.3.1 Financial architecture 
Figure 10 illustrates important design elements of Just Transition Transaction (JTT). 
Two structures are a blended finance vehicle (BFV) for JTT and a South African 
Just Transition Fund (JTF). The BFV would be housed at an existing institution, not 
yet determined. 
Key actors include commercial and concessionary funders, National Treasury and 
Eskom. International development finance institutions (DFIs) would likely provide 
the concessionary finance (denominated in US$), while the commercial funders are 
both international and domestic. Eskom is a key actor, receiving debt finance which 
it cannot access directly at present. A newly created Presidential Coordinating 
Committee oversees the JTF. 
The arrows show expected financial flows in a high-level outline. The commercial 
funding is the senior tranche, with concessionary finances subordinated, i.e. 
international DFIs would be paid after commercial investors. The blended finance 
vehicle lends on to Eskom, making available loan finance at near commercial 
rates and under a set of appropriate covenants. The BFV allocates most of the 
concessionary portion and releases the proceeds to the JTF. 
In order to access climate finance, the JTT needs to demonstrate that it will reduce 
emissions. The design envisages “measured achievement of South Africa’s and 
Eskom’s annual performance in meeting agreed reductions in the CO2 intensity of 
its electricity” (Meridian Economics 2020)Mitigation is related to the question of 
baseline, analysed further in section 0 above.
While the JTT is being pursued and has not yet been finalised (as of March 2020), 
the scale is expected to be large. A member of the team undertaking technical work 
on the JTT has described it as a “globally significant financial transaction to support 
and accelerate a key developing country s just energy transition” (Tyler 2019). At 
the UNSG Summit in 2019, a statement on behalf of the President indicated a scale 
of $11 billion (Ramaphosa 2019). 
The indication is that the BFV would provide “a long-term (~20yr) debt facility 
of approximately $ 11 bn to refinance the national utility Eskom, conditional on 
additional mitigation and social action, with credible remedies”(Meridian Economics 
2020) The overall funding is R150 – R200 billion, depending on exchange rates) 
The concessional component could be raised at a below sovereign, concessionary 
interest rate. Of this, concessionary international finance might raise $4 billion 
(about a third), and some $7 billion is expected to come from commercial lending, 
at correspondingly higher interest rates. 
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Ongoing financing of existing coal assets (“legacy assets”) is an operational 
requirement of an accelerated transition (Meridian Economics 2020). While not 
directly financing repaying of loans, the concessional funds help keep Eskom 
solvent. 
Only the concessional part would be raised in foreign currency. With the Rand being 
volatile, and even more so since the COVID-19 crisis, the exchange rate risk needs to 
be managed. 
Forward cover to hedge exchange rate risk would be added to the cost of the debt 
and is built into financial modeling. It has the benefit of hedging volatility for all 
parties, as the exchange range is set at the start of the 20-year loan period. 
2.1.3.2 Blended finance vehicle for just transition    
transaction and fund
Key to the just transition transaction is a blended finance vehicle (BFV). The BFV 
would channel blended finance for the accelerated phase out of coal-fired power, 
and also resource the Just Transition Fund, as illustrated in Figure 10 above 
(Meridian 2020). There are major purposes of the BFV. Firstly, it will make finance 
available to Eskom at attractive near commercial rates, subject to appropriate 
conditions. Secondly, the BFV will retain the bulk of the value of the subsidy initially, 
and then release a portion over time to a Just Transition Fund, subject to delivery of 
SA and Eskom annual performance to meet measurable targets to reduce the CO2 
intensity of its electricity (Meridian Economics 2020).
The finance is blended in two dimensions – combining domestic and international 
sources, as well as commercial and concessionary loans. Figure 10 above illustrates 
how domestic commercial loans (in ZAR) are to be blended with international 
climate finance at concessional rates (in $, subordinated) (Tyler 2019). In other 
words, the transaction could be backed by development finance institutions and 
private funders (Cohen 2019a).
The percentage points by which the concessionary components are below 
commercial rates will differ. For example, loans by the International Finance 
Corporation are expected to be less concessional than those by the World Bank or 
other multi-lateral development banks.  
The need to include domestic finance is driven in part by the scale of mitigation, 
which appears not to attract the full $11 billion investment. The design illustrated in 
Figure 10 above suggests both concessional finance and carbon payments; care will 
have to be taken not to double-count the value of carbon. 
The location of the BFV will have to be carefully chosen. The counter-parties to 
the just transition transaction are government represented by National Treasury, 
Eskom and the Just Transition Fund. 
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2.1.3.3 Just Transition Fund: spending on development   
projects 
The Just Transition Fund is a critical component of the architecture. To make the 
transition from coal to renewable energy a just one, no-one just be left behind. This 
means that the funds should be used for development projects and programmes. 
The vision is that the Fund supports “social programmes and kick-starts an 
unprecedented democratic era green industrialisation programme with associated 
growth and employment benefits” (Meridian Economics 2020). A geographic focus 
for such projects might well be Mpumalanga province – the heart of the central coal 
basin, most coal-fired power plants, high unemployment and a micro-cosm of the 
challenges that SA faces. The eestablishment of the JT Fund would “catalyse raft of 
diverse development projects and programmes” initially in Mpumalanga (Meridian 
Economics 2020). Supporting development projects will be important to affected 
communities and workers (Davie 2019), and hence contribute to social justice. 
The source of funding for the just transition fund is the concessional part of the 
loans, enabled by international climate finance. The interest rate differential would 
accrue to the Fund. 
There is no published estimate of the scale of funds that is expected to flow into the 
JT Fund. However, assuming that say 1% point of concessional finance flowed to 
the Fund, and that the concessional component is $4 billion (R 64 billion @ R16/$), 
then that would mean R 640 million ($ 40 million) per percentage point. Assuming 
the loan is for 20 years and 2% below commercial rates, simple multiplication yields 
around ZAR 26 bn ($1.6 bn), though financial modeling would be needed. 
The entity that would host the JT Fund is “yet to be determined” (Meridian 
Economics 2020). Presumably it would be a South African financial institution 
with a public mandate, for example the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
(DBSA). Regardless of the host finally determined, the institution and spending of 
the JT fund should be subject to multi-stakeholder governance arrangements, with 
oversight by a Presidential Coordination Committee.
At the national workshop held for this project, participants emphasised the 
importance of the quality of projects and directing capital to the right places. Good 
governance and institutions would be required to ensure that poor communities 
and workers dependent on coal benefit from the funding of projects, and take 
ownership as much as possible (see ownership models in sections 1.3.3 and 2.2). 
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2.1.3.4 Special purpose vehicle for non-JTT debt? 
Since the just transition transaction does not directly address Eskom legacy coal 
debt, a special purpose vehicle (SPV) has been suggested to fund other means of 
repaying loans, as well as operational finance requirements. A SPV would help to 
isolate as much of the bad debt related to debt for ‘legacy’ coal plants. Other parts 
of the system, notably transmission, could be financially viable (and hold ‘good 
debt’). Eskom financial crisis relates to both the stranded debt and refinancing 
debt. As existing debt mature, if Eskom’s financial position worsens too much, it 
may become unable to refinance the existing debt. To isolate this problem, the SPV 
would be a new legal entity with its own board, and thus finance would not flow to 
Eskom (nor to Treasury). 
There are different perspectives whether a SPV is the most appropriate tool (as 
expressed during a national workshop discussing an early outline of this case 
study). One view is that public funding should not be ring-fenced, and that there 
are many pressing needs – jobs, national health insurance, free basic education, 
debt in higher education, aviation, etc. In that context, this perspective would hold 
that no special case should be made for Eskom. There should be consistency in not 
prescribing assets, as that would lead to some share of investment is allocated to 
certain government-approved instruments, and thus not others. A different view 
is that there is a case for a SPV, since Eskom debt is a bigger risk to the economy 
as a whole. Eberhard (2019) argues that fiscal debt take-over into a refinancing 
mechanism, a SPV, is preferable to the other main options: continuing equity 
injections as in the past, or direct fiscal take-over. The SPV could refinance Eskom 
debt at near-government rates, be implemented rapidly and separate performing 
from non-performing entities (Eberhard 2019). Yet another view is that the focus 
on structure is not the key question, that the purpose should be identified and 
then a fit-for-purpose structure would follow. The challenges of governance apply, 
regardless of which vehicles are used. 
2.1.3.5 Challenges for governance of the just transition
This case study outlined the complex challenges facing the electricity sector, 
including operational, structural and financial constraints (see section 2.1.1). The 
issues are part of a broader and changing context of in the context of development 
(0), with particular challenges in SA’s political economy (1.1.1 above). Problems such 
as corruption, mismanagement and others have arisen in the changing relations 
between Eskom, in its current model, and the state. 
Similar dynamics might play out in relation to the just transition transaction, albeit 
with different actors. Despite the shift from the Zuma to a Ramaphosa presidency, 
relatively few arrests have been made of those responsible for ‘state capture’ – and 
more fundamentally, the interest groups are still active. 
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Vested interests in across the coal value chain might oppose the Just Transition – 
or seek to secure rents within it. With the introduction of concessional international 
climate finance, blended with domestic commercial finance, good governance will 
be critical. While this case study looks at ownership models that would distribute 
economic and political power, without governance mechanisms, investments might 
not flow in that direction. 
Private finance, particularly when sourced from large, financially weighty multi-
national corporations or multilateral development banks, implies some measure 
of influence, control, and, inevitably, power. How the priorities of local workers and 
communities weigh compared to corporate profitability and bond ratings remains 
to be seen. If some of the JTT finance were raised via carbon markets, another 
set of intermediaries would come into the picture. These questions point to the 
importance of governance and institutions. 
At the high level, a Presidential Climate Change Coordinating Commission (P4C) 
was agreed at a Jobs Summit convened by President Ramaphosa in November 
2018. Section 1.7 of the Framework Agreement focused on the Just Transition and 
states that: “Social Partners agree that a statutory body should be established 
under the Presidency in the form of a Presidential Climate Change Coordinating 
Commission (PCCCC) to coordinate and oversee the Just Transition, including how 
to maximise the opportunities for jobs, including the quantity and quality of jobs. 
This body could be accommodated in the recently released Climate Change Bill” 
(RSA 2018). By June 2020, the P4C had not yet been established and the Climate 
Change Bill was still delayed due to the COVID pandemic. 
The P4C will be a statutory body, overseeing the just transition. Once a national 
vision for a just transition has been adopted based on a good draft (NPC 2019), 
the P4C should take over. The P4C will have a major coordination function, across 
all three tiers of government and working closely with communities, labour and 
business. The P4C would need to relate to communities in Mpumalanga, labour 
(COSATU, SAFTU), local municipalities, CoGTA and SALGA; business leadership in 
South Africa, National Treasury, DEFF and many others. There is great potential – to 
promote pro-climate industrial action plans, polices that create employment, social 
plans (including those developed by communities in Mpumalanga, interfacing with 
Eskom’s work on a social plan), drawing on sectoral jobs resilience plan – including, 
but not limited to coal, and overseeing the funding of development projects 
through the JT Fund. Yet a detailed design of an institution that needs to manage 
transformative change has not been undertaken (or not in the public domain). 
Thematic focus areas would include energy (and particularly electricity), social 
plans, finance and industry. Specific work programmes need to be defined – not 
top-down, but by the local communities. 
A significant limitation of this case study is that is has not examined the governance 
of the just transition. Some initial thoughts are offered in this section, above, but 
this topic would benefit from a dedicated research effort of its own.
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The JT Fund is instrumental in enabling a “grand bargain” that results in structural 
reform of the electricity supply sector. This in turn leads to ‘Crowding in’ a portion of 
10 GW of RE capacity over 10 years. The transaction will create blended finance for 
large-scale RE (wind, solar PV, perhaps also CSP?), mostly grid connected. 
RE industrialization programme
In terms of wider economic benefits, a renewable energy infrastructure build 
programme could drive an industrialisation programme and bring some localisation 
of the technology value chain. Renewable power plants typically have lifespans of 
20-30 years, and an infrastructure build plan of say between 2-3 GW per year could 
provide a significant amount of ongoing production and operational jobs. 
The development of a renewables manufacturing industry will require the state’s 
commitment to continuous and long-term deployment of renewables. Localisation 
of the renewable energy development value chain would be considered an 
important element of the transition (Overy 2018). The potential for localised job 
creation is already in evidence in the REI4P, and this suggests that there could be 
new employment opportunities for current coal sector employees and other job 
seekers. For example, an Mpumalanga official reports that more than100,000 
job losses are expected in only two municipalities in the Nkangala Districts, 
not counting other associated sectors. The establishment of a renewables 
manufacturing plant in this area may serve to offset some of these losses.
Analysis of the employment impacts of expanding electricity generation in SA 
through renewables build programmes finds significant job creation benefits, 
as well as the need for skills training and education (Hartley et al. 2019). This 
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projected growth in energy demand and the predicted decommissioning timeline 
of coal power plants in the country by 2050 (ibid). It finds that in SA, electricity 
generation build programmes with higher shares of renewables are shown to lead 
to the highest net employment figures, despite a decline of 35-40% in coal jobs 
between 2020 and 2050 (Hartley et al. 2019). Jobs in renewable power generation 
are concentrated in the services, construction and manufacturing sectors (ibid). 
Across scenarios for different rates of renewables build, around 70% of new power-
sector jobs associated with renewable energy are categorised as highly skilled, 
defined as workers with an educational attainment level above Grade-12, - although 
employment is also created in other skill groups (Hartley et al. 2019). 
Significantly, the research indicates that renewables build programmes can create 
employment opportunities in almost all sectors – including the mining sector, which 
experiences a net increase in employment despite job losses in coal mining (ibid). 
Impressively, the employment impacts of renewables reach beyond the renewables 
programmes alone and could create up to 1.6 million additional jobs economy-wide 
by 2050 (Hartley et al. 2019). Yet large overall employment benefits at national 
scale in the long-term do not address the immediate concerns of those whose 
livelihoods are lost in a phase out of coal. 
Ownership matters 
In the context of a just energy transition, social / community / municipal 
ownership models that are smaller in scale and provide distributed generation 
may be an important factor in creating broad support for electricity infrastructure 
transformation. Proposals to privatise electricity supply face resistance from 
labour unions. Reasons for this include, fears that private corporations would 
take control of national assets, and the opinion that the energy transition is more 
efficiently handled under a single vertically integrated electricity entity (Anon 
2019). Furthermore, the REIPPPP has been criticised for falling short of providing 
productive opportunities for local communities (ibid). 
Referring back to our second research question, “what institutional innovation in 
ownership models would support renewable energy, both in terms of buy-in and 
scale?”. 
What might constitute institutional innovation?
Institutional innovation would overcome barriers to the provision of social and 
community level benefits. These might include, but not be limited to, the provision 
of affordable electricity, revenues, or socio-economic development, for example 
infrastructure and capital for economic enterprise or community services, 
particularly in those areas affected by mine closures and coal plant closures. 
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2.2.1 Renewable energy ownership models – 
drawing on international experience
International experience provides examples of renewable energy ownership 
arrangements. Table 6 below includes a summary description of models that may 
be suitable in SA from the international literature. The models are assessed on the 
basis of perceived transferability and benefits at the local level in the SA context in 
relation to a JT. 
Most renewable energy ownership models for municipalities and communities 
require institutional arrangements with municipalities and, or the national electricity 
utility. The ownership models are listed in according to the anticipated level of 
municipal involvement, from most to least.
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TABLE 6
Renewable energy project ownership models for municipalities and communities, examples from 
international literature
Ownership arrangement Description
Level of municipal 
involvement Suitability in South Africa Institutional innovation
Societal / community 
implications /benefits
A. Long Term Power Purchase agreements
Municipalities or municipal 
utilities can enter guaranteed 
off-take agreements called 
Power Purchase Agreements 
(PPAs).
Developer installs and operates 
an energy project for a fixed 
revenue stream, typically over 
a 15-25 years.
The PPA reduces perceived 
business risk and lowers the 
cost of capital investments, 
resulting in better returns for 
the developer and a lower-than-
retail price of energy for the 
municipality.
PPAs are typically delivered 
on a Design, Build, Operate 
and Transfer basis, so that 
ownership transfers from the 
energy generator developer 
to the off-taker municipality 
or municipal utility at the PPA’s 
expiry.
A. On-site PPAs 
Municipal governments 
can enter on-site PPAs, 
e.g. the developer installs 
and operates solar PV 
panels on the rooftops 
of city-owned buildings 
which are to be powered 
by them. Excess supply 
can be sold to the utility 
through a feed-in-scheme 
and excess demand can be 
bought from the utility. 
B. Off-site PPAs 
The city can also enter off-
site PPAs with an off-site 
clean energy generator to 
buy clean energy for one of 
the city’s facilities. 
Municipalities/municipal 
utilities would require:
 › strong credit-rating score to 
enter a PPA, failing which, they 
may be required 
 › to secure guarantees from 
a superseding government 
structure or 
 › pledge assets as collateral 
to the developer and its 
financiers. 
 › resources to acquire 
or commission good 
transactions advice to 
negotiate fair risk allocation 
in these long-term binding 
agreements, and understand 
the implications for their 
credit ratings. 
PPAs are suitable for municipalities 
with the required credit rating and 
resources to acquire or commission 
good transactions advice.
The transaction costs of PPAs are 
such that is worthwhile only for 
contracts of several megawatts, 
so municipalities and their utilities 
are likely the smallest units of 
organisations to enter renewable 
PPAs anywhere.
For example, the City of 
Johannesburg was unable to enter 
a bilateral PPA with a developer for 
a municipal waste to energy project 
because it failed a regulatory value-
for-money test: the energy tariff 
was higher than Eskom’s average 
electricity price, the developer 
entered a PPA (20 year Build Own 
Operate Transfer) with the national 
utility Eskom and the municipal 
utility under the REI4P for a with a 
profit-sharing agreement with the 
municipality. The developer will 
transfer ownership of the plant to the 
municipality at the expiry of the PPA 
(Franks et al. 2015).
Municipal utilities.
Municipality or municipal utility 
sets us wheeling agreements.
National utility – municipality 
- developer PPA that provides 
profit-sharing for the municipality 
and transfers ownership at the 
end of the project.
Success relies on competitive 
electricity tariffs, i.e. on Eskom 
tariffs being higher than 
historically set by NERSA.
Municipal control of 
electricity supply may:
 › Overcome reliability 
problems and lower tariffs 
through competition.
 › Municipal ownership of 
the RE plant at the end of 
the PPA.
 › Potential municipal 
revenue through profit-
shares.
 › No community ownership.
Ownership arrangement Description
Level of municipal 
involvement Suitability in South Africa Institutional innovation
Societal / community 
implications /benefits




utilities can enter ‘sleeved 
PPAs’ when they are 
unable to contract clean 
energy directly in their 
area.  
 
The municipality will enter 
a PPA with the renewable 
energy generator and 
simultaneously enter 
a linked PPA with its 
incumbent utility. 
The utility manages the 
offtake of power from 
the generator and takes 
management fees to credit 
the renewable generator 
electricity supply against 
the municipal demand 
requirements (Hedges 2017). 
To defray the costs of the 
long negotiation period to 
document sleeved PPAs, 
can create a consortium of 
multiple buyers of sleeved 
PPAs, (aggregated sleeved 
PPAs), e.g. Boston has with 
19 other USA cities (GeoCode 
International UG 2017:19).
The high level of complexity and 
transactions costs associated 
with sleeved PPAs in unnecessary 
because South African cities have 
access to sources of renewable 
energy for near-proximity 
generators.
Not suitable because 
transaction has high level of 
complexity and high costs.
D. Synthetic/virtual PPAs Municipalities can also enter 
“synthetic” or “virtual” PPAs 
when they are unable to 
directly contract renewable 
energy in their area.
 The generator in another 
part of the world exchanges 
the floating revenues it 
earns from selling its energy 
on the spot market for 
fixed payments from the 
municipality or consortium of 
municipalities (Gurch 2017). 
Requires an accessible spot 
market or access to foreign 
markets.
High transaction costs for 
complex contract to be able to 
calculate the risk of being “out of 
the money” in these contracts-
for-difference. 
Unnecessary high cost because 
South African municipalities do 
have opportunities for directly 
contracting renewable energy in 
their areas.
Not suitable because 
transaction has high level of 
complexity and high costs.
Source: Own table, created from literature review contribution by Vivid Economics
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Ownership arrangement Description
Level of municipal 
involvement Suitability in South Africa Institutional innovation
Societal / community 
implications /benefits
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Level of municipal 
involvement Suitability in South Africa Institutional innovation
Societal / community 
implications /benefits
B. Lease model / PAYGo leases
The municipal utility/
business plans, installs, 
finances and maintains a 
household renewable energy 
generator. 
The customer makes a fixed 
regular periodic payment to 
the municipal utility/business 
over a term ranging from 6 
months to 8 years in the case 
of most PAYGo leases (Lighting 
Global et al. 2020) to 20 years 
in higher-income contexts 
(Irvine, Sawyer, and Grove 
2012). The customer operates 
the generator at their own 
liability. 
This model is called a lease 
model in USA and Germany 
(C40 Cities 2018; GeoCode 
International UG 2017), and the 
PAYGo model in a developing 
world context (correspondence 
with an off-grid advisor at Tetra 
Tech, 17 March 2020).
Lease-to-own 
Ownership transfers to the 
customer upon completion of the 
contract term
Operating lease 
Ownership remains with the utility/
business, which dismantles the 
system upon the contract end. 
This does not involve any 
upfront investment costs for an 
operating lease in this, the most 
popular version of the lease model 
in Germany (market size is EUR 
3.4B). Ownership remains with the 
municipal utility/business. 
By contrast, in the developing 
world context, deposits are 
a common feature of PAYGo 
contracts. PAYGo contracts provide 
more flexibility than regular lease 
contracts, allowing customers to 
upgrade or downgrade the amount 
of power and energy they purchase 
from one month to the next 
(correspondence with advisor to the 
CEO of BBOXX, 17 March 2020). 
The PAYGo nano-grid: 
The commercial business installs a 
renewable energy generator base 
station in a house at the centre 
of a village. In return for keeping 
the equipment safe, the dwellers 
of the house receive electricity 
without charge. The generator 
serves c.50 homes and businesses 
via aerial cabling up to 200 metres 
away. Each customer’s electricity 
use is metred (MeshPower Rwanda 
2020). 
Ownership remains with the solar 
energy vendor.
Germany (GeoCode International 
UG 2017);
 › Municipalities can offer 
feed-in-tariffs for on-grid 
houses with leased renewable 
generators, as several have 
in South Africa (Strydom and 
Morar 2018); and
 › Local governments can 
subsidise the daily PAYGo rate 
that lower-income households 
pay (Romisher 2019).
Options in SA:
Household owner occupant 
Approximately 35% of South Africans 
own their own dwelling (de Villiers 2019).
Household landlord sub-lease to tenants. 
Landlords could enter lease-to-own 
arrangements with the municipal 
utilities/business and sublease the 
renewable energy generators to their 
tenants on an operating-lease basis. 
Pay as you go (PAYGo) leasing. A PAYGo 
model with mobile money, may initially 
not perform well in SA for the reason that 
mobile money does not have wide uptake 
(unlike in rural areas in East Africa 
(Lighting Global and Vivid Economics 
2019)). SA companies MTN only 
relaunched its mobile money service in 
South Africa this year and Vodacom shut 
down this service in 2016 (MyBroadband 
2020; Shapshak 2018). 
Feed-in-tariffs facilitate the use of 
the lease model in on-grid municipal 
settings such as in Germany and the 
USA. The South African utility Eskom 
does not seem to cater a feed-in-tariff for 
households (Strydom and Morar 2018), 
but some municipalities do.
In the Western Cape, nine municipalities 
have piloted / are piloting feed-in-tariffs 
for households. The Western Cape has 
the most solar rooftop installations (301) 
of the nine provinces (Strydom and 
Morar 2018).
The Eastern Cape has one municipality 
with an approved feed-in-tariff and has 
the second most installations (154) 
(Strydom and Morar 2018).
Lease or PAYG institutionalisation.
Feed-in-tariffs.
Lease to own model: 
ownership transfers to the 
customer upon completion of 
the contract term; 
OR
No upfront investment 
costs for an operating lease 
and ownership reverts to 
developer at the end of lease.
Ownership arrangement Description
Level of municipal 
involvement Suitability in South Africa Institutional innovation
Societal / community 
implications /benefits
Prepaid renewable 
generators with tax 
incentives (B2C) 
Customers pay the upfront 
cost of a solar system, but 
do not own it. They receive 
electricity with maintenance 
and warranties covered by 
the installing company for the 
lifespan of the system and 
receive tax credits over the 
first few years (Irvine et al. 
2012). 
Tax incentives spread over a 
number of years are key to 
this model’s attractiveness 
to customers, so either the 
municipality, provincial or the 
federal state need to be able 
to offer these. 
Suitable for wealthy citizens 
/ organisations. This model 
depends on state tax credits 
to be attractive for those who 
are able to afford the upfront 
cost as well as feed-in-tariffs for 
household units. 
Setting up of feed-in 
schemes.
Tax credits exist for 
businesses under Sections 
12B and 12L of South Africa’s 
Income Tax Act (Western 
Cape Government 2017), 
rather than for households.
Sale-and-lease back of 
citizen-owned renewable 
power plant model to the 
municipal utility
Citizens pay for and own 
solar panels in a plant (Wien 
Energie 2020). The utility 
pays them a regular, fixed 
payment for leasing the 
system from the citizen-
owners. This model is used in 
Vienna.
While the Vienna municipality 
piloted this scheme, there is 
nothing to stop it from being 
replicated by commercial 
businesses. 
Wealthier citizens with 
capital who are looking for 
an investment with low risk 
and low-to-medium return 
could engage in this. Ownership 
remains with the investors, whom 
it pays a fixed-monthly income.
International crowdfunding 
is used by a SA company 
Community Energy for upfront 
capital for design, build, operate 
and maintain solar systems 
for use by schools, property 
developers and corporates 
(Community Energy 2020). 
Requires innovation / 
insurance to address risks of 
theft and vandalism.
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Ownership arrangement Description
Level of municipal 
involvement Suitability in South Africa Institutional innovation
Societal / community 
implications /benefits
Prepaid renewable 
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Cape Government 2017), 
rather than for households.
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solar panels in a plant (Wien 
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payment for leasing the 
system from the citizen-
owners. This model is used in 
Vienna.
While the Vienna municipality 
piloted this scheme, there is 
nothing to stop it from being 
replicated by commercial 
businesses. 
Wealthier citizens with 
capital who are looking for 
an investment with low risk 
and low-to-medium return 
could engage in this. Ownership 
remains with the investors, whom 
it pays a fixed-monthly income.
International crowdfunding 
is used by a SA company 
Community Energy for upfront 
capital for design, build, operate 
and maintain solar systems 
for use by schools, property 
developers and corporates 
(Community Energy 2020). 
Requires innovation / 
insurance to address risks of 
theft and vandalism.
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A municipal utility / business 
can install the renewable 
energy system, owned by the 
household / multi-occupancy 
building / institutional owner of 
buildings, and is contracted to 
perform maintenance (GeoCode 
International UG 2017). 
The household / building(s) 
consumes some and sells some 
electricity back to the municipal 
utility/business through net-
metering, net billing or feed-in 
schemes (C40 Cities 2018). 
This model can work in new multi-
occupancy buildings either with 
direct wires or with smart metres. 
Municipal utilities act as 
competition to commercial 
businesses in this model.
Applicable for wealthier citizens 
with the capital to buy their own 
renewable generators, or, in the case 
of new multi-occupancy residential 
buildings, stand-alone segments of a 
generator owned by themselves and 
their fellow apartment owners. 
The model can also be used for where 
the municipality is the customer, as 
the City of Durban is for five of its city-
owned buildings.
Setting up of net-metering, net 
billing or feed-in schemes for 
community set-ups.
Institutional innovation to provide 
start-up capital for poorer 
communities.
Potential for creating small 
revenues to fund towards start-up 
capital for new projects.
Energy performance 
contracting by households 
from a municipal utility or 
businesses
The municipal utility/business 
sells energy savings by acting 
as a hired project manager. It 
designs, develops, finances and 
manages the energy savings 
project by retrofitting customers’ 
buildings and installing and 
integrating renewable energy 
systems and equipment owned by 
its customers. 
It is paid by the household from 
the energy savings realised 
(C40 Cities 2018; GeoCode 
International UG 2017) in fixed 
monthly payments. 
Municipal utilities act as 
competition to commercial 
businesses in this model.
Not applicable for poor communities 
/ households with low electricity 
consumption.
This service would best serve high 
energy consumers (industry and 
high-income and large households, 
since electricity demand is strongly 
correlated with household income and 
dwelling size (Ye et al, 2018)). 
The model may be boosted by tax 
deductions for businesses for energy 
efficiency under Section 12L of South 
Africa’s Income Tax Act (Western 
Cape Government 2017). 
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Ownership arrangement Description
Level of municipal 
involvement Suitability in South Africa Institutional innovation
Societal / community 
implications /benefits
 ‘Community energy’ projects
Community initiatives to 
bring renewable energy into 
their neighbourhood usually 
require minimal involvement 
from public entities but can 
be boosted through municipal 
support.
(3) Social enterprises and civil 
societies
In the UK, the main sources for 
the necessary upfront capital 
for projects up to £200,000 
are community shares and 
for larger projects are loans 
(Braunholtz-Speight et al, 2020). 
Community shares are non-
transferable, withdrawable 
shares in a society with an 
asset lock, applied in the UK to 
societies with at least £10,000 
in share capital and at least 20 
members (Community Shares 
Unit 2018). The operating social 
enterprises or organisations are 
often run by no more than three 
full-time staff with the assistance 
of dozens of (local) volunteers. 
Municipalities or the national 
utility or municipality can 
encourage community projects 
through price guarantee 
schemes, such as FiTs (as is 
the case with majority of UK 
community projects).
Alternatively, municipalities could 
incentivise the public sector to 
enter into long-term electricity 
contracts with community-led 
providers (Braunholtz-Speight et 
al, 2020).
In the South African context, not-for-
profit social enterprises can play the 
role of running renewables projects 
that provides community shares.
Lifeline Energy is an example of a 
not-for-profit social enterprise in Cape 
Town that produces electricity from 
solar and wind energy. It uses the 
generated electricity to power radios 
and MP3 players for educational 
purposes (Lifeline Energy 2020). 
The produced energy is used for the 
device only, hence this scheme does 
not depend on FiTs or other price 
guarantees. 
Municipalities in South Africa have 
started piloting FiTs with success. 
Community-led tender 
supported by tax incentives 
and non-profit technical 
assistance
Communities pool their 
finances and time to tender for 
a contractor to install renewable 
energy generators at their homes 
(Irvine et al. 2012). Ownership 
rests with the participating 
households.
This approach benefits from 
volume discounts, builds 
confidence in the choice of 
contractor and the associated 
price, and overcomes customer 
inertia.
The City of Portland (USA) 
provided community organising, 
technical assistance, project 
management and rebates for 
community-led tenders of 
household rooftop PV panels 
(Irvine et al. 2012)
South African municipalities would 
need to identify neighbourhood 
leaders to organise community 
schemes.
Rebates for community-led 
tenders to overcome the lack of 
financial capital in communities.
Institutional capacity to resource 
and support communities.
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2.2.2 Renewables ownership in the Just 
Transition 
2.2.2.1 A role for Eskom?
Eskom might partner with municipalities or communities. An Eskom-partnership 
of this nature is being piloted at Lynedoch EcoVillage near Stellenbosch in the 
Western Cape. This micro-grid system was installed in 2016 by the Eskom’s 
Research, Testing and Development Laboratory network (Bloem 2019). The 
embedded system consists an array of an array of a twenty-seven resident 
household embedded photovoltaic (PV) solar system array, inclusive of smart 
meters (Bloem 2019). Initial assessment of this experimental pilot suggests useful 
learnings for developing this option for sustainable ‘intentional’ communities (ibid). 
A role for local government. Municipalities may have a role to play in in enabling or 
participating in arrangements for community ownership. 
2.2.2.2 Community ownership
This section is based on a report published by Project 90by2030, a South 
African environmental and social justice movement. A number of models have 
been proposed with the intention that a significant level of ownership is social or 
community in nature. The table below focuses on variations of what is termed 
‘community energy’ project in Table 6’s list of ownership models in international 
literature.
The models for community ownership are assumed to fall in one of two generation 
categories. The first is community owned small-scale embedded generation 
(SSEG), for example in low- income apartment blocks or in “solar farms” with 
localised energy distribution (Overy 2018). This option includes as actors, 
community members and the municipal utility. Sources of finance would need to 
be identified and a protocol settled on for identifying beneficiaries (ibid). Project 
maintenance models and ownership and executive control agreements would need 
to be careful consideration and negotiation (ibid). The second is the community-
owned mini-grid (ibid). Communities might be energy self-sufficient or supply the 
municipal or national utility. Participating communities would require significant 
support to develop technical capacity, understanding of regulations and to secure 
funding (ibid).
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TABLE 7
Renewables ownership models for communities
Ownership models Actors Funding options
Examples and assessment of their 
benefits for communities
The open investment model allows 
individuals and small businesses hold junior 




Small businesses hold junior participation 
rights in the form of shares or credit
 › investment International example exists in Germany.
Junior investors have no say in the running of 
the project.
Investors are located anywhere, so it’s not a 
driver for local benefits.
The community benefit or compensation 
model is driven by private RE developers 
and structured to benefit local community 
members affected by the project.
Private RE developers
Local community
 › developer owned International example exists in England.
Community benefit payments are voluntary, 
and amounts are questioned. 
No community control Benefits fund 
community projects; schools and education/ 
training, and environment and heritage
The community connected model or the 
split-ownership model. Developers are 




 › Developer or municipal utility offers 
ownership rights to community members
International example exists in Denmark. 
Community do not acquire decision-making 
rights. 
Benefits dispersed to share-holders only, not 
to wider community
A for-profit community-based model 
established by community members.
Community investors  › investment International examples exist in USA and 
Germany.
Profits are returned to investors. Benefits are 
not widely dispersed to the community
In the not-for profit community-based 
model, the ownership set-up can vary. It 
returns revenues to further cooperative 
and/or community development.
cooperatives, community trusts or non-
profit enterprises
 › membership fees
 › investment options
 › sliding scale tariffs that subsidise poor 
homes
International examples exist in Spain, 
Denmark, Brazil.
These projects provide welfare benefits, 
e.g. investment in local projects, free 
energy for participants in financial 
difficulties
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This case study set out to explore how climate finance-policy packages can 
transform SA’s energy infrastructure and ensure a just transition in SA’s electricity 
sector. Two sub-questions where put forward in the Introduction (see section 1.4). 
What catalytic role might international climate finance have in the SA electricity 
sector in crisis, a climate crisis that requires the accelerated phase out of coal 
globally and the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequality? And 
what institutional innovation in ownership models would support renewable energy, 
both in terms of buy-in and scale? 
On the second question, we found that community ownership is critical to buy-
in, with two types being community owned small-scale embedded generation 
and community-owned mini-grids. Significant institutional innovation is needed 
in a context historically dominated by a vertically integrated utility, Eskom, that 
had a monopoly on electricity supply. We also found possibilities for institutional 
innovation within Eskom – and the crises of climate, debt and a post-COVID 
world may unblock long-standing resistance to serious reform of the state-owned 
enterprise. 
An important area for further research includes a focus on Mpumalanga, with only 
initial considerations outlined in this case study. Piloting models of community 
ownership requires a bottom-up, community- and locally-driven process in the 
province. We also point to the need to co-develop a funding strategy with local 
communities, workers and municipalities, which could provide guidance of the JT 
Fund’s spending on development projects. 
Conclusion 
2.3
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Turning our attention from the local to the global. Can learnings from a transition 
transaction in SA be applied in other countries? The UCT team would be very 
interested in exploring this question in relation to research on just transition 
in Germany, the EU, Brazil, India, and Indonesia (if the respective partners are 
interested). We would expect that some lessons might be applicable, while 
other factors will be context-specific. On the latter, we would expect to see more 
similarities in countries with high coal dependence and socio-economic risk in an 
energy transition (India, Indonesia, other countries with coal-dominated energy 
sectors – Germany, Poland). The implications of pre-salt oil in Brazil may also be of 
interest, though the commodity is significantly more volatile in its prices and these 
are determined internationally, unlike coal. There will be differences in institutional 
arrangements (e.g. structures of utilities). Many countries are starting just 
transition processes, and that would be a desirable condition to undertake a case 
study. In different contexts, international climate finance could accelerate the phase 
out – or avoid new building of – fossil fuel energy supply. How the just transition for 
affected communities and workers will be funded is likely a common concern. The 
European Green Deal includes significant provision for distributing funding within 
the Union. The Amazon Fund has historically funded REDD+. The JT fund in South 
Africa would fund development projects in Mpumalanga. What can we learn from 
these approaches? 
The just transition transaction would be a globally significant financial transaction 
to accelerate the phase out of coal-fired power plants in South Africa. If realised at 
the scale of $11 billion, it is expected to be the “largest and most significant global 
climate finance transaction to date” (Davie 2019). Beyond the transaction itself, 
what are the implications for climate finance? And particularly our understanding of 
international climate finance? If the finance relates to coal, is it still climate finance? 
The answer on the last question is yes, in a dynamic context. While international 
climate finance under the UNFCCC has typically funded incremental costs 
of renewable energy and other technologies funding the phase-out of coal 
and potentially other fossil fuels is an important new focus. The approach to 
international climate finance under the Paris Agreement aims to make financial 
flows consistent with low-emissions and climate-resilient development pathways 
(see 1.4.3 above). Renewable energy technologies, especially wind and solar PV, are 
now least-cost in many countries, including South Africa. Projects are bankable, 
and do not need concessional finance. In these cases, there are now incremental 
benefits rather than incremental costs. Just transition transactions, we propose, 
are a way of implementing Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. Further thinking 
is needed on how to make finance flows consistent with a pathways towards low 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. 
The just transition transaction represents a shift to funding the phase out of coal. 
One element is that international climate finance supports the additional costs of 
accelerating decommissioning. 
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The transaction is not funding the ‘legacy debt’ of existing coal-fired power stations. 
Other means of paying those debts are needed, as distinguished in section 2.1.2.2 
above. Funding the faster decommissioning of coal does contribute to financial 
sustainability, by enabling access to capital markets. The extent to which coal-fired 
power will be funded depends on global financial markets and trends in divestment. 
By 2019, over a hundred global financial institutions having indicated that they 
would exit coal (Buckley 2019). The South African context with chronic operational 
and structural issues, including state capture, had particular historical factors 
shaping legacy debt. Further research might investigate to what extent other coal 
phase out programmes face the issue of legacy debt. 
For the transition to be just, no-one can be left behind. This applies first and 
foremost to the affected communities and workers, both in terms of assistance 
in relation to their existing livelihoods (see 1.3.3) and creating new livelihoods 
including ownership of renewable energy systems (see 2.2). The JT Fund in this 
case study of South Africa is a concrete example of funding the socio-economic 
transition costs. The impacts on local government and particularly the most 
vulnerable municipalities, will require a major socio-economic process. Some 
affected individuals and households may migrate to other provinces. Management 
of the transition will require more than studies (including this one) and a facilitated 
process. 
COVID-19 will require all countries to take up more debt. Countries that have no 
fiscal space will require debt relief or forgiveness (see 1.2.2 above). Since the just 
transition transaction can assist with financial sustainability, we postulate that 
such transactions will become highly relevant in the post-COVID world. ). The 
financial architecture of the JTT includes blending international and domestic 
finance and spending on development in a manner that promotes social justice. 
Some modifications may be needed to account for even more ‘negative’ fiscal 
space and to address the health and socio-economic impacts of the pandemic. Yet 
broadly speaking, the JTT design seems well suited to promote a greening of a ‘red’, 
socio-economically focused rescue-and-recovery package. This is an opportunity 
for international climate finance to be relevant to the major challenge to socio-
economic development that the world is facing in 2020, and for an unknown time 
into the future. 
Is the climate finance for a just transition transaction always international? In the 
case study for South Africa, the concessional component plays a critical role, but 
it crowds in what is expected to be a larger (two-thirds) component of domestic 
commercial finance. Is finance at the scale required for just transitions always 
blended - international and domestic, concessional and commercial? Are there 
other and possibly better models of financing a just transition? 
Transitions do not take place instantly. Existing generation needs to be kept 
running and grid stability maintained. Support for the transition towards more 
decentralised, smart grids is needed. 
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On the first sub-question, the case study demonstrates that international climate 
finance as part of a just transition transaction in South Africa can have a catalytic 
role. This finding should be understood in a nuanced sense, in that it is clear that 
ICF on its own is not sufficient, the finance is blended with domestic commercial 
funding. Much as a catalyst is not the only element in a reaction but works only with 
reagents in a chemical reaction, ICF can be catalytic by changing other elements. 
In this understanding, ICF is no ‘silver bullet’ nor does it resolve all the problems in 
SA’s electricity sector. That said, the JTT, if realised at the scale being discussed, 
can have a catalytic effect on the accelerated phase out of coal and thus make a 
very large contribution to mitigation in the country. The emission reductions are 
partly direct, with fewer GHG from coal-fired plants being decommissioned, but 
also indirect (or catalytic) by ‘crowding in’ renewable energy. Renewable energy 
technologies are increasingly competitive and thus do not require public funding 
– in particular, ‘green finance’ for wind and solar PV is commercial finance. The 
JTT plays a catalytic role as transition finance. As the downward pressures on 
investment in fossil fuels by global financial institutions are starting to reduce 
investment in coal in SA, and as ‘green finance’ is scaling up, transition is finance 
is needed to make the change – notably decommissioning coal-fired power plants 
faster – and to keep the system going, notably the transmission grid. Last but 
perhaps most important in the SA context – the JTT is catalytic in responding 
to the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequality. The JTT could 
make climate action something that is supported by poor communities, workers 
and local authorities in Mpumalanga, changing it from a concern by a few middle-
class environmental activists to a broadly supported programme. In this sense, our 
answer to a component of the research question (see 1.4) is positive. 
In summary, the just transition transaction potentially redefines what we mean by 
(international) climate finance. 
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In the main report, the just transition transaction was compared to COSATU 
proposal to use pension funds from the Public Investment Corporation. 
Table 6 lists the similarities and differences between the two tables in more 
detail. A version of this table was discussed in a meeting on 18 March 2020, 
facilitated by Harald Winkler for the UCT team (the meeting was originally 
planned as an in-person seminar at UCT, but due to the coronacrisis, it was 
held virtually). The meeting was attended by participants working closely 
on both proposals and others with an interest. The Chatham House Rule 
applies and no statements are attributed. The UCT team had prepared an 
earlier version of the table. The column on ‘possible synergies’ was added 
subsequently. 
This section has examined some differences between the JTT and PIC 
proposals. It has also pointed to similarities and possible synergies. The two 
proposals fund different parts of the overall problem of ‘Eskom debt’. More 
acute divides over unbundling can still allow restructuring to be defined 
around an ITSMO and support for renewable energy. The JTT would provide 
a source of funding for development projects that is a share of a large 
deal. Very concretely, there is common cause about funding development 
projects in Mpumalanga, and providing assistance to workers and 
communities, so that no-one is left behind. Looking beyond the proposals 
to actors supporting them, a coalition can be built in support of a just 
transition.
Appendix:
Comparison of JTT and PIC 
proposals with possible synergies
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TABLE 8











Areas where the 
proposals and 
their supporters 
could work well 
together
Central proposal JTT funds additional costs of 
decommissioning coal and just 
transition
International climate finance 
provides concessional part of 
blended finance to accelerate 
phase out of coal. Concessional 
part flows into just transition 
fund, for development projects. 
Does not directly fund 
repayment of loans, but enables 
access to capital markets and 
keeps Eskom solvent as it 
decarbonises 
PIC fund provides other 
means of repaying loans
Invest PIC funds to repay 
loans, sourced primarily 
from Public Investment 
Corporation (PIC), which 
oversees the Government 
Employees Pension Fund 
(GEPF)
Funding two 
different parts of 
total Eskom debt 
– PIC directly for 
repaying loans, JTT 
indirectly providing 
access to capital 
markets
Key conditions Accelerated phase down 
coal fired power stations and 
unbundling Eskom
(Meridian Economics 2020)
“A commitment by 
government that it will not be 
privatised.
That no worker will be 
retrenched.” (COSATU 2020)
Reskilling and redeployment 
of workers under a just 
transition (Merton 2020b)
No explicit phase out of coal, 
beyond conversion of coal to 
gas at end of plant life. 
Discussion of restructuring 
of Eskom would focus on 
criminality and worker 
ownership (of a utility 
via government, and for 




JT Fund could 
support reskilling 
of workers and 
transition costs 
for communities 
where coal power 
plants are closed 
down









Governance and institutional 
structure
Coal risks: large debt of Eskom’s 
existing coal fleet, and new coal 
risky investment in carbon-
constrained world (already 
happening, more so in future) 
Corruption and criminality
Corporatization of Eskom, 
having it operate as a private 
company has contributed - 
(AIDC)
Just transition Central to concept (Meridian 
Economics 2020; Tyler 2019)
Mentioned in COSATU 
proposal
“A Just Transition plan be 
developed and implemented 
for workers at power stations 
and coal mines reaching the 
end of their life spans and 
their host communities, in 
particular Mpumalanga, 
Limpopo and the Eastern 
Cape.” (COSATU 2020)
More detailed explanation in 
earlier document (COSATU 
2016)
Just transition is 




can be built in 
support
Coal phase out - 
timing
Accelerated phase out of coal, 
i.e. faster retirement of coal-
fired power plants




Meridian Economics (Meridian 
Economics 2020; Tyler 2019) 
but distinct from Eskom 
Sustainability Task Team
Alternative Information & 
Development Centre (AIDC 
2020), but distinct from 
Cosatu
FINANCE – TECHNICAL
Scale of debt to 
be addressed
$ 11 bn (Meridian Economics 
2020; Ramaphosa 2019)
ZAR 200 bn @ R18.2/$ 
(exchange rate volatile)
R250 bn 
Reduce Eskom debt from 
R450 bn to R200bn … social 
compact between govt, PIC 
and DFIs (COSATU 2020)
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ZAR72 bn ($4bn) – no published 
estimates, assume concessional 
part is smaller than commercial 
($7 bn)
All of it?
Extend loan based on “surplus 
resources” of GEPF at zero or 
below market (AIDC 2020)
GEPF, but also development 
finance institutions, 
Unemployment Insurance 
Fund (UIF) (Davie 2020). 
R 6 bn interest free loan from 




X % below market rates
For every percentage point, ZAR 
0.64 billion / year
0% “or below market interest 
rates” with condition on 




Blended finance vehicle (BFV)
To 1) make finance available to 
Eskom at attractive rates; and 2) 
release concessionary amount 
s.t. performance on CO2 
intensity (Meridian Economics 
2020)
[Eskom Sustainability Task 
team also separately proposed 
a SPV]
Special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
(COSATU 2020) would be 
used to restructure Eskom’s 
debt, aiming for sustainable 
level (Davie 2020)
Type of finance Blended - combines domestic 
and international; commercial 
and concessionary loans
domestic commercial loans (in 
ZAR)
international climate finance 
at concessional rates (in $, 
subordinated) (Tyler 2019)
Backed by DFIs and private 
banks (Cohen 2019).
7% of the R2.2-trillion 
managed by the PIC 
(Mailovich 2020) on behalf of 
the Govt Employees Pension 
Fund (GEPF)
Flow of funds Donors funds flow into BFV, 
which lends debt finance to 
Eskom
Probably give public money 
directly to Eskom Treasury
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WHO PAYS (BACK) ?
Repaying loan BFV repays senior commercial 
tranches and sub-ordinated 
concessionary tranches
BFV lends on to Eskom – debt 
finance (Tyler 2019);
So Eskom has to repay, which 
assumes it becomes financially 
viable again or part of it (ITSMO)
Even at 0%, principal has 
to be repaid. “critical to 
understand that this is not a 
blank cheque or a donation” 
(COSATU 2020)
While the language 
differs, there is 
consensus that 
loans have to be 
repaid. Differences 
about interest at 
some rate or zero.
Electricity tariffs R250bn is stranded even 
with Eskom’s proposed tariff 
increase, and NERSA awarded 
less.
Tariffs are too low even 
if Eskom were perfectly 
efficient, and it is clearly not 
efficient, and much of the 
money is being stolen and 
misspent. but giving them 
more money under these 
circumstances will not fix the 
problems of under investment 
in maintenance, cost-plus 
mines, or now in new plant
Structural issue for 
both proposals
SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
Social compact Not explicitly, but could build on 
NPC Vision for JT
Summit should happen ‘soon’ – 
delayed to March 2020 and then 
post-COVID 
“COSATU’s approach is based 
upon a social compact, where 
all parties from government to 
labour, business and society 
make a contribution and 
where necessary, a sacrifice 
for the sake of the national 
interest.” (COSATU 2020)
Social compact 
for vision of a just 
transition must 
include Eskom, 
unions, and all 
stakeholders
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Will have to be carefully chosen, 
possibly DBSA
“DFIs” (COSATU 2020), 
i.e. Development Finance 
Institutions
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA) 
and Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC) (AIDC 
2020)
New Development Bank?





JT Fund – receives part of 
concessional portion, over time. 
As above, ZAR 0.64 billion / 
year for each percentage point
at 3%, close to 




– should be 
supported by all
Are pensions at 
risk?
If Eskom fails, and whole 
economy and all pensions are 
at risk.
JTT aimed at Eskom not going 
down.
AIDC and others argue that 
pensions are not at risk, as 
GEPF changes as part of the 
1994 negotiations from a 
pay-as-you-go scheme to fully 
funded. 108% funded, above 
legal requirement of 90%, 
so even if all withdrew – not 
plausible – sufficient funds 
(AIDC 2020; Brown 2020)
GEPF can take ‘hair-cut’ on 
existing Eskom bonds without 
risk (AIDC 2020) (see below)
Changed, because PIC 
investments in JSE lost 20-
30% of value with COVID; 
Post-COVID, 
pensions at risk. 
Synergy in 
protecting what is 
possible. 
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change / crisis / 
emergency
Integral, and specific
“77% of SA’s greenhouse gas 
emissions are from energy; 
~40-45% from electricity” 
(Meridian Economics 2020)
COSATU mentions in relation 
to electric vehicles, and public 
and private investment in 
RETs locally, 4 provinces, 
helping workers whose jobs 
are at risk (COSATU 2020)
AIDC section on ‘Lead South 
Africa on a path towards a just 
transition away from fossil 
fuels’ (AIDC 2020)
Common support, 
difference in how 
explicit the support 




Yes, core to climate finance Claims that research shows 
natural attrition requires 
no retrenchments; if 
decommissioning “goes too 
fast, retrenchments will take 
place”; if too slowly, younger 
workers eventually retrenched 









Yes, into Gx, Tx and Dx
Suggests that ITSMO can 
become financially viable
Absence of transaction manager 
in Eskom is part of problem
Not unbundling, importance 
of public ownership
Eskom should have role in 
renewables (AIDC Eskom 
research, forthcoming)
SUPPORTING AND 
OPPOSING ACTORS AND 
COALITIONS AND THEIR 
IDEAS
Key proponents President (statement to UNSG 
Summit) (Ramaphosa 2019)
Eskom Sustainability Task team 
? (no longer meets)
COSATU – interventions to 
ANC NGC (COSATU 2020)










labour: Economic Justice 
(Neil Coleman); business: 
some – Assoc of Savings and 
Investment of SA; Eskom – CEO; 
Finance – Minister Mboweni
Pravin Gordhan, Tito 
Mboweni, Cyril Ramaphosa; 






Plus: Audit Eskom contracts 
and expenditure, seize looted 
assets, dismiss mismanagers, 
coal suppliers and IPPs 
reduce prices, Eskom 
generate RE, debt recovery 
plan from munics etc, reduce 
management size, reskill 
workers, representation on 
Eskom Board (COSATU 2020)
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